# CHINA TRADEOFF DA

### Notes

#### Overview:

Simple argument that an increased military focus on NATO trades-off with efforts to deter China. Budget, personnel, and time are all finite so investments in security cooperation are “zero-sum.” The “Asian Pivot” has been a priority for a while now because China is revisionist and is the number one threat to US interests. Ukraine complicated that switch, but the US is back to prioritizing China and deterring aggression against Taiwan (and the rest of Asia). The plan both physically and perceptually detracts from US efforts and invites aggression from China. A war over Taiwan goes nuclear and is arguably a bigger threat than anything in Ukraine.

#### Pros:

There is a big debate on the necessity for an Asian Pivot and solid link evidence about the inability for the US to fight on two fronts, so the trade-off lit is pretty good. The impacts are comparatively bigger. The risk of escalation in Ukraine is lower now and Russia was exposed as less of a threat than expected. China on the other hand has the same aggressive intentions but more power. There’s ev in the file that actually makes the comparison, so if you win a unique link, you can outweigh.

#### Cons:

Weak uniqueness. Ukraine is going to thump a lot of DAs. All the link evidence about the trade-off is descriptive of the status quo (suggesting that Biden is failing by getting too involved in NATO and not enough in Asia). It’s also possible for the military to “chew gum and walk” at the same time.

#### To Do:

Specific DOD spending links or Budget Request politics

Cards that describe the aff’s policy as labor/resource intensive

Uniqueness about US draw down in Europe

## 1NC

### Next Off

#### a. Uniqueness: US military is prioritizing China – current budgets and diplomatic efforts are key to maintain deterrence, specially over Taiwan.

Benar News ’22 (Staff written, “US not seeking to create ‘Asian NATO,’ defense secretary says,” 2022.06.11, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/singapore-summit-day-1-06112022015249.html)-mikee

The U.S. defense secretary emphasized partnership as the main priority for the American security strategy in the Indo-Pacific during a keynote speech in Singapore on Saturday, but stressed that the U.S. was not seeking to create “an Asian NATO.” The United States remains “deeply invested” and committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, Lloyd Austin said in a 30-minute speech during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum here. “We do not seek confrontation and conflict and we do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” the U.S. defense chief said, referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin had cited Ukraine’s interest in joining the regional inter-governmental alliance as a reason for launching an invasion of the smaller country next-door in late February. The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific have recently expressed concern over China’s increasingly assertive military posture in the region, and that the war in Ukraine might encourage Beijing even more. Beijing, for its part, has been complaining about what it sees as attempts by the U.S. and its partners to form a defense alliance in the region. When leaders from the U.S., Japan, India and Australia met last month for a summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, China cried foul. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Washington was “keen to gang up with ‘small circles’ and change China’s neighborhood environment,” making Asia-Pacific countries serve as “pawns” of the U.S. hegemony. “I think Secretary Austin made it very clear that there’s no appetite for an Asian NATO,” said Blake Herzinger, a Singapore-based defense analyst. “The U.S. values collective partnerships with shared visions and priorities, without the need to form a defense alliance,” he told BenarNews. ‘A region free from coercion and bullying’ The U.S will “continue to stand by our friends as they uphold their rights,” said Austin, adding that the commitment is “especially important as the People’s Republic of China adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.” He spoke of the Chinese air force’s almost daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and an “alarming” increase in the number of unsafe and unprofessional encounters between Chinese planes and vessels with those of other countries. Most recently, U.S. ally Australia accused China of conducting a “dangerous intercept,” of one of its surveillance aircraft near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. On Friday, Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. During the meeting that lasted nearly an hour, the two sides discussed how to better manage their relationship and prevent accidents from happening but did not reach any concrete resolution. Austin used his speech on Saturday to remind Beijing that “big powers carry big responsibilities,” saying “we’ll do our part to manage these tensions responsibly – to prevent conflict, and to pursue peace and prosperity.” The Indo-Pacific is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) “priority theater,” he noted, adding that his department’s fiscal year 2023 budget request calls for one of the largest investments in history to preserve the region's security. This includes the U.S. $6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen multilateral information-sharing and support training and experimentation with partners. The budget also seeks to encourage innovation across all domains, including space and cyberspace, “to develop new capabilities that will allow us to deter aggression even more surely,” he said. The U.S. military is expanding exercises and training programs with regional partners, the defense secretary said. Later in June, the Pentagon will host the 28th Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise with forces from 26 countries, 38 ships and nearly 25,000 personnel. Next year, a Coast Guard cutter will be deployed to Southeast Asia and Oceania, he said, “the first major U.S. Coast Guard cutter permanently stationed in the region.” Protecting Taiwan “Secretary Austin offered a compelling vision, grounded in American resolve to uphold freedom from coercion and oppose the dangerously outmoded concept of aggressively-carved spheres of influence,” said Andrew Erickson, research director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, speaking in a personal capacity. “The key will be for Washington to match Austin’s rhetoric with requisite resolve and resources long after today’s Dialogue is over,” Erickson said. “It is that follow-through that will determine much in what President Biden rightly calls the ‘Decisive Decade’,” he added. Last month in Tokyo, Biden announced a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) that Austin said would provide better access to space-based, maritime domain awareness to countries across the region. The U.S. defense secretary spoke at length about his government’s policy towards Taiwan, saying “we’re determined to uphold the status quo that has served this region so well for so long.” While remaining committed to the longstanding one-China policy, the U.S. categorically opposes “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.” “We do not support Taiwan independence. And we stand firmly behind the principle that cross-strait differences must be resolved by peaceful means,” Austin said. The U.S. continues assisting Taiwan in maintaining self-defense capability and this week approved the sale of U.S. $120 million in spare parts and technical assistance for the Taiwanese navy.

#### b. Link: Security cooperation is zero-sum. Focus on Europe trades-off with Asia. The aff escalates US involvement in NATO at the expense of deterring China.

Townshend and Corben ’22 (Ashley Townshend is director of foreign policy and defense and Tom Corben is a research associate in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. “Op-Ed: War in Ukraine Threatens America's Ability to Counter China,” The Strategist, MAR 16, 2022, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-war-in-ukraine-threatens-america-s-ability-to-counter-china>)

As the United States slides deeper into a proxy war with Russia, Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly concerned about the long-term implications of the Ukraine crisis for America’s power and position in this part of the world. And so they should be. While President Joe Biden’s initial approach to Ukraine struck the right balance of resolve and restraint—marshalling global allies in support of sanctions against Russia and funnelling military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine—the war is now sapping more and more American attention and defence resources. A dangerous tit for tat is taking hold. Washington’s lethal military aid and economy-breaking sanctions signal an investment in the war that could slip beyond Biden’s original articulation of limited interests. Russia’s nuclear threats and increasingly brutal operations have triggered further US involvement, including the deployment of advanced F-35 fighters and expensive Patriot missile-defence systems to NATO frontlines in Eastern Europe, and a massive $13.6 billion Ukraine emergency bill passed by Congress last week. Calls are getting louder for a ‘limited no-fly zone’ which, though rebuffed so far, may become politically harder to resist. All this is understandable given the humanitarian carnage. But hot on the heels of the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s unsettling to watch Washington’s strategic gaze drift, once again, away from a robust "pivot to Asia." As we argue in a new United States Studies Centre report, these developments are especially worrying given that the Biden administration has so far failed to deliver on key defense components of its regional strategy. Senior US officials insist that events in Europe will not see the Indo-Pacific or efforts to balance Chinese power deprioritised. Earlier this month, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, again promised that Washington was capable of sustaining "deep commitments" in both theaters simultaneously, even at great cost, just as it had in the past. But while America can—and must—continue to buttress European security, it doesn’t enjoy the luxury of riches or unchallenged military primacy required to underwrite an expansive global strategy against two great-power rivals. Matching ends with means in the Indo-Pacific—America’s so-called ‘priority theatre’—requires difficult trade-offs between competing priorities, including in Ukraine. A more sustainable division of US and allied defense responsibilities in Europe and Asia is urgently required. Biden understands this and deserves credit for attempting to match US global interests and commitments in his first year. Poor execution aside, his Afghan withdrawal showed a willingness to make tough, politically unpopular trade-offs. His initially restrained approach to the Ukraine crisis suggested he would keep it in global strategic perspective. But Washington won’t be able to sideline Moscow from its foreign policy agenda the way it had hoped. Delays to the publication of the US national defense strategy and national security strategy suggest that Russia is forcing a hurried reassessment of Biden’s global priorities. In a worst-case scenario for the Indo-Pacific, it’s possible these documents will return US military strategy to an equally weighted focus on Asia and Europe—contradicting hard-fought efforts in recent years to make China the Pentagon’s outright priority. This is not a callous point to make. America simply doesn’t have the military resources required to prosecute an effective multi-theater strategy in an era of great-power rivalry. Nor is it spending enough to change this equation: while the 2018 national defence strategy recommended three to five percent real growth in defense spending annually to keep pace with China and Russia, not a single defense budget since has met these targets. Biden’s budget continues this unsatisfactory trend. And in contrast to the stark warnings from top brass at US Indo-Pacific Command, who see conflict with China as a possibility this decade, the administration’s defense budget prioritizes long-term military modernization in anticipation of high-end conflict in the 2030s - leaving the US underprepared to deal with Chinese military coercion over the next few years. Budget shortfalls are mirrored by slow-moving efforts to realign US forces globally. Efforts to empower US allies are even more important as Washington is once again pulled in conflicting global directions. Indo-Pacific allies should advocate for more. As a priority, Australia should caucus with Japan and other close security partners to push for overdue reforms to US export controls on defense technology. Indo-Pacific allies should also press Washington for greater insight and input into its regional military planning. A credible collective defence strategy requires clarity on when, where and how to address shared defence challenges. Biden’s effort to build support among regional allies for a Taiwan contingency is a step in this direction. But while Taiwan is the Pentagon’s "pacing challenge," regional countries face Chinese military coercion across a far wider range of lower intensity scenarios, as China’s intimidation of an Australian military aircraft in the Arafura Sea last month attests. New strategic planning initiatives must reflect these realities. In the end, however, these initiatives can’t change the strategic physics of the Indo-Pacific. A favorable balance of power with China can only be upheld with unprecedented US support. Alliance modernization is a necessary component of this strategy, but it’s not a substitute for a robust US military posture and presence in the Indo-Pacific. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, America’s capacity to deliver an effective defense strategy for the region will depend on its ability to keep its escalating involvement in check and in global strategic perspective.

#### c. Impact:

#### 1. A failed Asian Pivot emboldens China to invade Taiwan.

Sacks ‘22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/dont-pivot-pivot-asia)//BB>

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.

#### 2. That war goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are intermingled.

Talmadge ‘18 (Caitlin; associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; 11/18; "Beijing’s Nuclear Option"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option; SM)

As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the **risk of war** with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its **political** and **economic** pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that **Chinese expansionism** will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the **Taiwan Strait**, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an **aircraft carrier** through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the **South China Sea**. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**-resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign **against Taiwan**-no longer seems as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation **going nuclear** are higher than most policymakers and analysts **think**. Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." This assurance is misguided. If deployed **against China**, the Pentagon's preferred style of **conventional warfare** would be a potential recipe for **nuclear escalation**. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's **key military assets** at **minimal cost**. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a **nuclear power**. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also **intermingled them** with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to **attack one** without **attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its **nuclear arsenal**. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were **still able to**. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a **nuclear confrontation**. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their **current grand strategies**, the risk is likely to **endure**. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a "no first use" pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. Nato stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on nato soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other's territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a **conventional war** that threatens China's **nuclear arsenal**. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate **pressures to escalate**- especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations **endangered** or damaged China's nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims **beyond winning** the conventional war- that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China's nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a **prelude to regime change**. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that **limited nuclear escalation**- an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation- was a **viable option** to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is **Taiwan**. Beijing's long-term objective of **reunifying the island** with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington's longstanding desire to **maintain the status quo** in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for **regaining control** over the island was closing and launch an attack, using **air** and **naval** forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or **bombard the island**. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Were Washington to **intervene** on Taipei's behalf, the world's sole **superpower** and its rising **competitor** would find themselves in the first **great-power war** of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. **conventional military operations** would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities- whether doing so was Washington's stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the **last 30 years**, this outcome would be all but **guaranteed**. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to **blockade Taiwanese harbors** or **bomb the island**, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an **antisubmarine campaign**, which would likely threaten China's "boomers," the four nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China's conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these **transmitters** would thus not only disrupt the activities of China's attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders **unsure** of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for **protection**, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China's ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically **more vulnerable**. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese **attack submarines** could **inadvertently sink** a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since **correctly identifying** targets remains one of the **trickiest challenges** of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within **shooting range** of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to **shoot first** and **ask questions later.** Adding to China's sense of vulnerability, the **small size** of its nuclear armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its **sea-based deterrent**. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be **cut off** from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to **destroyed ports**. If that happened, China would essentially have no **naval nuclear deterrent**. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to **contend** with China's growing **land based** conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch **ballistic missiles** against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to **degrade** this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually **impossible** to do so while leaving China's nuclear ballistic missile force **unscathed**. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the **same base headquarters**, meaning that they likely share **transportation** and **supply networks**, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some **command-and-control networks**, or that the United States would be unable to **distinguish** between the **conventional** and **nuclear** networks even if they were physically **separate**. To add to the challenge, some of China's ballistic missiles can carry either a **conventional** or a **nuclear** warhead, and the two versions are virtually **indistinguishable** to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some **nuclear ones** in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China's coastal air defense network in order to fight a **conventional war** would also leave much of its nuclear force **without protection**. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country's interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military's failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990-91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, highintensity conventional war. China's vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing's worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing's eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China's nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China's real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely **endanger** much of China's nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States **actually intended** to target all of China's nuclear weapons would be **incidental**. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them **threatened**. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the "no first use" pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could shift China's **assumptions** about U.S. **intentions**. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a **deliberate effort** to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a **prelude** to a nuclear attack, it might see **limited nuclear escalation** as a way to **force an end** to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to **instantaneously destroy** the U.S. air bases that posed the **biggest threat** to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose-on an unpopulated area or at sea-as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

## Uniqueness

### U – Brink

#### The status quo is goldilocks – Biden is balancing both regions now, but new demands trade-off and complicate existing strategies.

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House. “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China,” NY Times, May 19, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/biden-trip-asia.html)-mikee>

With the administration’s attention having shifted to Ukraine, President Biden plans to emphasize that the United States can counter aggression in both Europe and Asia. President Biden departing for South Korea on Thursday. Mr. Biden’s first trip to Asia will pose diplomatic challenges on several fronts. SEOUL — President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific.

### U – Long Term

#### Long-term efforts still point to China – time and resources are zero-sum.

Drezner ’22 (Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Can the United States focus on China while countering Russia?,” May 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/18/can-united-states-focus-china-while-countering-russia/)-mikee

It is worth remembering that in the year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Biden sought a “stable” relationship with Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. The reason he wanted stability in that relationship was so the United States could shift its attention toward China and the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, in the week before Biden’s June 2021 summit with Putin, the Group of Seven and NATO communiques focused more on building a coordinated response to China. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was also keyed on a reorientation toward China. Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine obviously pushed “countering Russia” to the top of the policy queue. Putin’s continual ratcheting down of war aims from “regime decapitation and occupation of Kyiv” to “let’s take the entire Donbas region” to “let’s take Luhansk oblast” suggests that U.S. support of Ukraine has been a foreign-policy success. The war in Ukraine raises the awkward question of whether the United States can still reorient toward the Indo-Pacific region, however. Biden administration officials sure think so. Many of them told Bloomberg News’s Peter Martin earlier this month that they “see the conflict’s toll and the slew of sanctions placed on Moscow as leaving Russia hobbled for years to come. Combined with bolstered European defense spending, that means the U.S. may have a freer hand to accelerate its long-term shift toward China, viewed as America’s biggest future challenge.” Such a supposition holds up in theory. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused a sea change in European perceptions of Russia. This explains Germany’s increased military spending, Sweden’s and Finland’s applications for NATO membership, and even Switzerland’s flirtation with more cooperation with NATO. A better-armed Europe and a depleted Russia should free up U.S. time and resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific. And China experts such as Andrew Nathan argue that the Biden administration has the necessary strategic acumen to counter China.

### U – China Priority Now

#### Biden prioritizing China now – diplomatic meetings and resources.

Shear ’22 (Michael D. Shear is a veteran White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, “Biden Hosts Southeast Asian Leaders as He Tries to Return Focus to China,” May 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/12/us/politics/biden-asian-nations-china.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article)-mikee

WASHINGTON — President Biden on Thursday began hosting the leaders of Southeast Asian nations at the White House for a two-day visit, delivering a message of solidarity — and aiming to provide a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region — even as much of his administration remains focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The summit, which concludes on Friday, is intended to cover an array of topics, including trade, human rights and climate change. But it is also part of an effort by Mr. Biden’s foreign policy team to highlight one of the president’s primary goals: assembling a united front against China as it increasingly demonstrates its economic and military might around the world. As a candidate, Mr. Biden promised to make China a central focus of his foreign policy. Instead, a senior administration official acknowledged to reporters this week that the war in Europe had created daily demands that had consumed the time and energy of the president and his team. But the official, who requested anonymity to discuss preparations for the summit, said Mr. Biden remained concerned about, and focused on, the need to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. The gathering of Mr. Biden and the other world leaders in Washington is an opportunity to demonstrate that commitment, the official said. On Thursday evening, the White House announced new investments of about $150 million in the region as part of a series of agreements between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. The investments by the United States include $40 million for clean energy projects in Southeast Asia. A senior White House official said the administration estimated that the money would be used to help raise or finance as much as $2 billion for the construction of the projects. The United States also pledged to invest $60 million to deploy additional maritime assets — led by the Coast Guard — to the region, and to perform training and other activities in coordination with other countries aimed at enforcing maritime laws. And the administration said it would spend $15 million to expand health surveillance programs in Southeast Asia and better detect Covid-19 and other airborne diseases in the region. The president is also traveling to Japan and South Korea from May 20 to May 24, a trip that will focus in large part on China. White House officials have not provided details about the trip, but the president is expected to meet with fellow leaders of the other so-called Quad countries: Australia, India and Japan. On Thursday, the leaders from the ASEAN countries met with Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers before gathering at a Washington hotel to discuss business opportunities with Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, and executives from American industries. Mr. Biden welcomed the leaders to the White House on Thursday evening in a brief ceremony on the South Lawn. The group posed for a picture before walking into the White House for dinner. On Friday, the Asian leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in the morning, and then with Mr. Biden at the White House later in the day. According to the administration official, the group will discuss trading opportunities; transit through disputed waterways, including the South China Sea; and other topics. One of those topics is likely to be Myanmar, an ASEAN member, where Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was ousted as the country’s civilian leader last year when the military staged a coup. The administration official said the United States and countries in the region were focused on the situation and frustrated by it. An American national security official said the United States and the other nations agreed to leave a chair empty during the summit for Myanmar as a way of registering their disapproval of the actions by its military. The official also said the United States supported the decision by ASEAN to prevent a military representative from Myanmar from attending the summit. The gathering is also intended to be an opportunity for Ms. Harris to demonstrate her focus on the region. She led an American delegation to Asia last summer, using a speech in Singapore to denounce China’s “unlawful claims” over the South China Sea, which she said “undermine the rules-based order and threaten the sovereignty of nations.” The administration official said Ms. Harris planned to use Friday’s meeting with the Asian leaders to focus on climate action, clean energy and sustainable infrastructure.

#### Pivot to Asia is high now. But it’s not permanent.

Wilkinson ’22 (Tracy, covers foreign affairs from the Los Angeles Times’ Washington, D.C., bureau “Remember the ‘pivot’ to Asia? U.S. wants to reassure Pacific allies it’s still on,” Los Angeles Times, <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-02-09/us-pivot-asia-reassure-pacific-allies>)

Like many U.S. governments before it, the Biden administration intended a foreign policy “pivot” toward China and Asia. Instead, Washington quickly faced war in Gaza, a chaotic pullout from Afghanistan and a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken arrived in Melbourne, Australia, for a regional tour that will see him try to reassert U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China and to reassure allies worried that their issues are being given less priority in Washington. Blinken is scheduled to meet with his Australian, Indian and Japanese counterparts, whose nations, together with the U.S., form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, an on-again, off-again group established as a counterbalance to Beijing. Speaking to reporters traveling with him, Blinken insisted that the Biden administration has maintained a “sustained focus” on the region despite an all-consuming and urgent mission to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine. He said he was on the phone in consultations over Ukraine during the long flight from Washington to Australia — the latest of some 200 engagements in recent weeks — and acknowledged that video-conferences and calls between Washington and European capitals on the crisis would continue to hum in the background of the talks in Melbourne. “Having said that, the world is a big place, our interests are global and you all know very well the focus that we have put on the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific region,” Blinken said. Blinken and the Quad representatives will tackle an “increasingly broad and deep agenda,” he said. It will be dominated by what most other countries in the region see as Chinese aggression on land and sea, as well as other issues such as emerging technologies that can also be threatened by Beijing. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne welcomed Blinken’s arrival and that of the other Quad ministers, saying that by gathering here they were “voting with their feet in terms of the priority that they accord to [Indo-Pacific] issues.” Target fine lines and wrinkles while visibly firming skin with our anti-aging treatment for men. Kiehls first all-in-one anti-aging moisturizer for men is specifically formulated for men's thicker, coarser skin. This revitalizing anti-wrinkle... U.S. officials tacitly acknowledge a pep talk is in order. Blinken “will demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region,” Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, said ahead of the trip. “We intend to demonstrate that our partnerships deliver, and they deliver practical and real benefits to our own peoples and to the peoples of the region.” Some in Asia expected greater interaction with President Biden, who campaigned on a shift to “strategic competition” with China as a pillar of his foreign policy. During Biden’s eight years as vice president, the Obama administration had also promised a “pivot” to Asia as its diplomatic focus. Instead, as crises erupted around the world, full-on engagement was delayed. In the meantime, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has converted himself into leader for life, continued to claim Beijing’s sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea; pushed its massive “Belt and Road” program, which spends billions of dollars in development money to gain influence in Europe, Africa and Latin America; and ignored international criticism of its treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority, which the U.S. has called a genocide. This week, China again took the global center stage by hosting the Winter Olympics. The U.S. and several Western countries refused to send government delegations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin attended, striking a masterfully symbolic pose with Xi as the leaders of a new post-democratic alignment. The two men issued statements lavishing support on one another. “A much more powerful and assertive Xi government increasingly sees U.S. geopolitical strategy and activities in Asia through a very similar lens as [the one through which] Putin has long viewed American activities in Europe,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said in an analysis of Blinken’s tour. “To China, the Quad feels a lot like NATO encroachment does to Putin.” One potential flashpoint is China’s claim on Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway republic much as Putin views post-Soviet Ukraine. Despite its stated focus on the region, the Biden administration still seems to be seeking its footing in Asia policy, said Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. The Trump administration receives credit for designating China as a strategic competitor, Green said, although it did not follow through with policy. Biden “has picked up and amplified” that decision, “but has essentially no economic strategy for Asia.”

### U – Taiwan Focus

#### US increasing its involvement with Taiwan now.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

Standing firm to support Europe does not equal diminishment of focus on Asia. In the past several weeks alone, President Biden has hosted leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington for the first time. He traveled to Seoul and Tokyo, where he met with leaders from the Quadrilateral Grouping (Australia, India, Japan, the United States), in addition to strengthening bilateral and trilateral relations in Northeast Asia. He launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Importantly for Taiwan, the Biden administration also committed to the Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a new effort to break the logjam and invigorate U.S.-Taiwan economic ties. President Biden also signed legislation to push for Taiwan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly and Secretary of State Antony Blinken rallied other countries to lend support for Taiwan’s participation. In other words, the Biden administration is deepening its investments in Asia and upping its focus on Taiwan. The more pressure Beijing has placed on Taiwan, the more visible America’s support for Taiwan has grown. President Biden’s statement that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense should be understood as an insight into his state of mind, rather than a signal of a significant policy shift. Biden clearly feels strongly about defending Taiwan and deterring Beijing’s aggression. He is not an activist who is seeking to radically alter the cross-Strait status quo, though. His administration remains committed to deterring unilateral changes to the status quo. This longstanding American position reflects America’s guiding focus on upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Secretary Blinken’s May 26 speech provided a clear, well-coordinated articulation of America’s interests relating to China and Taiwan. The State Department’s decision to update its website on Taiwan policy following ​Blinken’s remarks reflects the authoritative nature of the speech. Beijing’s growing military capabilities clearly are focusing minds in Washington, Taipei, and elsewhere on taking steps to strengthen deterrence. At the same time, I do not detect enthusiasm in Washington or elsewhere for dramatic shifts in government policies on Taiwan, barring an aggressive move by Beijing that compels countries to respond. Given these dynamics, Taiwan’s best path for gaining greater international support for its political autonomy, economic dynamism, and dignity on the world stage is by continuing to demonstrate its steady, principled, and practical in its approach to cross-Strait tensions. The more Taiwan does so, the more it stands to benefit by contrast from Beijing’s pressure. Taiwan also would be well-served to seize the opportunity the Initiative on 21st Century Trade presents. A strong coalition of countries already has made clear the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to global security and prosperity. American, European, Japanese, and other countries’ interests will dictate their further involvement in cross-Strait issues if Beijing ratchets up tensions further.

#### US-Taiwan security cooperation is increasing, and there are plans to expand it further, but only with sufficient resources and dedicated effort.

Yeager and Gerichten ’22 (Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer. “REESTABLISH THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP-TAIWAN,” JANUARY 7, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/reestablish-the-u-s-military-assistance-advisory-group-taiwan/)

The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. BECOME A MEMBER U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The Original Organization The original U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Formosa (this last word was later changed to “Taiwan”) operated from 1951 to 1979 and was instrumental in professionalizing and modernizing Taiwan’s military. During the Cold War, the United States established military assistance advisory groups in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle East to strengthen allies threatened by communism. The group in Taiwan was a reincarnation of the similarly named organization that operated in China from 1947 to 1949, until the Republic of China was defeated by the Communists and withdrew to Taiwan. From 1951 to 1955, this group was responsible for all U.S.-Taiwanese defense matters. In 1955, upon ratification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was established and absorbed many personnel, resources, and responsibilities that had previously been aligned to the advisory group. The original advisory group was established in 1951 to facilitate large-scale arms transfers and provide military training and assistance to deter Chinese aggression. The impetus for establishing the organization was a U.S. military aid package worth $300 million — equivalent to over $3 billion today — that would have overwhelmed the small U.S. military staff in Taiwan at the time. In 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States shifted its policy to support Taiwan and sent a small team to the island to prepare a comprehensive report on Taiwan’s military that was the basis for the aid package. Once established, the advisory group was led by a major general and initially manned with 116 U.S. servicemembers, but later grew to over 2,000 personnel. The group established a comprehensive American-type military school system for Taiwan’s officer corps, helped the country to implement conscription, trained and advised the military, and oversaw military aid. The U.S. advisory group deeply understood the Taiwan military, shaped its defense concepts, and built complementary U.S. war plans. Lessons from previous U.S. security cooperation efforts — including recent failures in Iraq and Afghanistan — suggest that Washington’s willingness to influence higher-order issues of mission, organizational structure, and leadership is critical. The original advisory group had offices in the same building as the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and U.S. staff sections were directly attached to their Taiwanese counterparts. It embedded advisers in all major Taiwanese training units and at the regimental level and above. All of the group’s initiatives were informed by the in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s military that was gained through this integration. The group also influenced Taiwan’s defense concepts. It translated hundreds of U.S. military training manuals into Chinese, which shaped Taiwan’s warfighting approach. In the early 1950s, U.S. advisors helped Taiwan to adjust its defense concept from static to mobile defense. The United States later helped Taiwan to shift from a defensive approach to an offensive posture, to hasten an end to the Korean War by implicitly threatening a second front in China’s southeastern underbelly. Prior to the establishment of the Taiwan Defense Command, the advisory group developed U.S. war plans that complemented Taiwan’s own. It also planned U.S. support to the island’s wartime logistical requirements. As part of the U.S. strategy to leverage Taiwan to help to end the Korean War, the organization planned to help to deploy 25,000 Taiwanese military personnel to the Korean front by the end of 1954. A reestablished advisory group could similarly improve Taiwan’s defenses today while creating regional security benefits for the United States and its interests. The Requirement: Control the Increasing Flow of U.S. Military Resources to Taiwan A new advisory group would ensure that increased U.S. defense support provided to Taiwan is synchronized and woven into a holistic plan that enables a credible defense of the island and helps to reverse the erosion of cross-strait deterrence. China has rapidly modernized its fleet and increased its inventory of major naval combatants since 2005, while the U.S. fleet has aged and shed major combat vessels. The U.S. Navy still leads — 213 major combatants to China’s 145 — but China is expected to reach rough parity in major combatants and surpass the U.S. Navy in total submarines by 2030. Further, China’s navy is deployed almost entirely in the Indo-Pacific while America’s is dispersed around the globe. There is ample opportunity to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence to help offset declines on the U.S. side of the equation. This organization would help to fulfill the legal mandate in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The law requires the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.” The group would ensure that the growing volume and complexity of “defense articles” and “services” being provided to Taiwan arrive in a timely manner and are “sufficient” to deter Chinese aggression. Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance. Unless it reestablishes a dedicated Taiwan-focused organization, U.S. military staff planning capacity — rather than U.S. policy — may soon become the limiting factor that slows the momentum of expanding U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives. U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan headquarters are staffed with hundreds of personnel dedicated to bilateral military cooperation and supporting the defense of their host-nation allies. The U.S. military lacks an equivalent organizational headquarters focused on military cooperation with Taiwan. The United States needs an integrated organization that is dedicated to military deterrence and tightly networked with other elements of national power. It should be flush with U.S. interagency personnel and allies — especially from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. To have credibility with Taiwan’s senior officers, it should be led by a U.S. general or flag officer who is empowered to speak authoritatively on military matters on behalf of the U.S. government. It should start with 100 to 200 personnel and grow as additional initiatives come online or scale-up. It should also maintain well-staffed satellite offices in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Washington. The advisory group would facilitate training for Taiwanese personnel beyond the borders of Taiwan, in the United States and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. This new security cooperation and assistance organization should be headquartered in Taiwan to enable integration with Taiwanese counterparts. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, it should be affiliated with the American Institute in Taiwan — the non-profit organization responsible for U.S. relations with Taiwan. This new organization would not be a military “command” — like the old U.S. Taiwan Defense Command — and placing it in Taiwan would not constitute “basing” troops on the island. Most of its personnel should be contractors and retired military personnel, with a smaller contingent of active-duty liaisons and interagency personnel to fill key leadership and staff positions. These personnel would serve in an unofficial capacity, consistent with how the institute is currently staffed in order to maintain Washington’s adherence to the One China policy. If placing this new organization on the island is deemed politically infeasible, it could be headquartered elsewhere — perhaps Palau, Guam, Japan, or Australia — with forward elements in Taiwan.

### U – Resolve High Now

#### Resolve high now because Biden is prioritizing Asia above Europe

Erlanger ’21 (Steven, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance,” *New York Times*, 9-28-2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html>)

Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question: Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since former President Barack Obama first articulated that America should “pivot” resources and attention to Asia as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help Australia deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up a $66 billion deal for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” France was enraged. Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for France’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal with little if any warning — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. Emmanuel Macron’s Second Term as President of France With the reelection of Emmanuel Macron, French voters favored his promise of stability over the temptation of an extremist lurch. Cabinet: President Macron’s new government combines continuity with change, as newcomers at the foreign and education ministries join first-term veterans. New Prime Minister: Élisabeth Borne, the minister of labor who previously was in charge of the environment, will be the second woman to hold the post in France. Overcoming Tragedy: Ms. Borne’s father, a World War II resistance member and a Holocaust survivor, killed himself when she was 11, an experience she has rarely discussed in public. Rape Allegations: Two women have accused Damien Abad, the newly appointed minister for solidarity and for disabled people, of raping them. Mr. Abad has denied the allegations. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.”

### AT: Ukraine

#### Biden is reducing involvement in Ukraine– China is the top-priority now

Ferguson ’22 (Niall Ferguson is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” June 5, 2022, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-05/niall-ferguson-on-china-biden-should-dust-off-the-word-detente>)-mikee

To his credit, Biden dialed back his administration’s goals in a measured op-ed for the New York Times on May 31. “We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. … [T]he United States will not try to bring about [Putin’s] ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.” But the reality is that the administration has become the arsenal of Ukraine’s democracy, not the broker of a peace that it is leaving to Ukraine to define. Three of Europe’s most important leaders — French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — are distinctly uneasy about this. They would much prefer to see an imminent ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations. But to speak of compromise in the current febrile atmosphere of Ukrainophilia is to invite charges of appeasement. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy reacted angrily to Kissinger’s argument for a peace based on the status quo ante. “I get the sense that instead of the year 2022,” Zelenskiy snapped, “Mr. Kissinger has 1938 on his calendar.” Yet Zelenskiy himself has said repeatedly — most recently in an interview on May 21 — that he would regard as “victory” a return to the territorial position on Feb. 23, which was what Kissinger plainly meant by the status quo ante. That would mean Ukraine taking back Kherson and the ravaged city of Mariupol. It would mean pushing Russia out of its “land bridge” from Crimea to Russia. And it would mean completely reversing all the gains the Russians have made in the eastern Donbas region. Zelenskiy knows, and so should we, what a daunting task that represents. In a speech last week, he acknowledged that Russia has seized around a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. In an interview with Newsmax, he admitted that Ukraine was losing “60 to 100 soldiers per day as killed in action and something around 500 people as wounded in action.” Even with an open-ended commitment from the US to supply them with weapons, do the Ukrainians have the trained manpower to drive Russia out of all the territory it has occupied since Feb. 24? And if this brutal war continues through the summer, and is still being fought as the year wanes and the temperatures begin to fall in Europe, what then? Vladimir Putin is surely counting on the usual divisions within the Western alliance and within American politics to resurface sooner or later. The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.” Almost immediately, US officials, led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, walked this latest gaffe back. But when is a gaffe not a gaffe? When the president of the United States says it three times. By my count, that is the number of occasions Biden has pledged to come to Taiwan’s defense since August last year. What are the practical implications of ditching the half-century-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, which dates to Kissinger’s compromise with Zhou Enlai in 1972? In his book “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” Elbridge Colby argues that the US can and must prioritize the defense of Taiwan. Colby was deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development under Donald Trump. His book has been a hit with China hawks precisely because it gets specific about how the US could cope with a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. “Defending forces operating from a distributed, resilient force posture and across all the war-fighting domains,” Colby writes, “might use a variety of methods to blunt the Chinese invasion in the air and seas surrounding Taiwan.” The US and its allies might “seek to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft before they left Chinese ports or airstrips. The defenders might also try to obstruct key ports; neutralize key elements of Chinese command and control … And once Chinese forces entered the Strait, US and defending forces could use a variety of methods to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft.” “There’s a very real chance of a major war with China in the coming years,” Colby tweeted last month. “Everyone with influence should be asking themselves: Did I do \*everything\* I could to deter it? And make it less costly for Americans if it does happen? … China has the will, the way, and increasingly a sense of urgency to take us on over stakes that are genuinely decisive for us (and the world, for that matter).”

#### Aid to Ukraine doesn’t trigger perception of abandonment in Asia, yet. But, further moves to solidify US presence in Europe would

Walker ‘22 (Dustin, nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Biden Must Do Better Than Obama on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/27/biden-obama-russia-ukraine-military-strategy-nato/>)

The Winter Olympics are just around the corner. Russian President Vladimir Putin has Ukraine on his mind. In Washington, the Pentagon is preparing a new defense strategy that looks beyond the Middle East to focus on the Pacific and China. The White House, meanwhile, is concerned about costs and wants to rein in military spending. Sound familiar? Well, this is exactly what the world looked like once before—in 2014. When the Obama administration’s defense strategy was released in March 2014, the document was obsolete the day it was published. It did not mention Ukraine, even though Putin’s little green men had already seized Crimea. It did not mention the Islamic State by name, though the group’s fighters had already captured Fallujah. With the defense budget under spending caps and the threat of sequestration, the Pentagon had to spend tens of billions of dollars in contingency funds to rebuild European deterrence following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and to defeat the Islamic State in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s attempt to pivot to Asia stalled, and the U.S. military edge over China continued to shrink. As history threatens to repeat itself, U.S. President Joe Biden—who served under Barack Obama as vice president—looks perilously close to following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Biden faces the same question as in 2014: How can the United States stay focused on China while dealing with the crisis in Ukraine? Just as it was then, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and countering China will not be strategically effective or politically sustainable if it is premised on sacrificing the commitment to credible NATO deterrence and defense. But given finite resources, the United States cannot confront China, the most powerful adversary it has ever faced, without substantially changing how it achieves strategic ends in Europe—especially when it comes to military power. That’s not just an urgent strategic question to answer now, as Washington decides how to deal with Russia’s threatened invasion of Ukraine. It also needs to be at the core of the Pentagon’s strategy that is set to be published as early as March. The administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Right now, the United States can do a lot to support Ukraine, impose costs on Russia, and assure NATO allies without compromising its strategy to counter China. At the top of the list are accelerated deliveries of defensive military equipment to Ukraine—especially anti-armor, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities—as well as intelligence support and humanitarian assistance. If Russia does invade, Biden should get much more serious about sanctions than Obama was in 2014. Washington should target the wealth of Putin’s cronies in Western financial hubs, terminate Russian access to the SWIFT global payment system, prohibit transactions in Russian sovereign debt, sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and cut off access to U.S. technology critical for industries favored by Putin, including defense. The Trump administration’s technology sanctions that have seriously hobbled the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei are an excellent precedent for this. The United States should also join NATO efforts to reinforce its eastern flank, including contributing U.S. troops to support the temporary activation and deployment of NATO’s Response Force. For this eventuality, the Biden administration has placed up to 8,500 U.S. military personnel on alert. But even as Washington reacts to Moscow’s threats to overturn the European security order, China and the Indo-Pacific must remain the primary focus of the United States’ strategic calculus. To that end, the administration should ensure sanctions do not inflict collateral damage on Indo-Pacific allies and partners. In particular, ensnaring India in Russia-focused sanctions for New Delhi’s planned purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system would be a mistake. Sanctions won’t stop the S-400 deal, but they would play into the narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not a trustworthy partner for New Delhi. To keep its focus squarely on the Indo-Pacific, the United States must exercise restraint in what forces it sends to reinforce NATO should Putin invade Ukraine, and from where. Forces should not be taken from the Pacific. They should be relocated within Europe, from the United States, or from lower-priority theaters. For example, air and ground forces stationed in the Middle East could be moved to southeastern Europe to bolster NATO while remaining close enough to respond to any contingency. Deployment of an additional U.S. Army brigade combat team—of limited utility vis-à-vis China—may be sensible. But the Pentagon should avoid new, long-term deployments of assets in low supply, such as missile defense systems and advanced platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Biden administration should also remember that allies provide the bricks, while the United States provides the mortar. NATO allies should contribute the bulk of any new forces deployed to guard the alliance’s eastern flank while the United States provides key military enablers such as command and control, logistics, and combat medicine. The good news is that allies are in fact stepping up: Denmark, France, Spain, and the Netherlands have all recently announced or proposed reinforcements of ships, fighter aircraft, and ground forces. Even as it responds to the crisis in Europe, Washington can take parallel steps to bolster deterrence in the Pacific—so that the current attention on Europe is not interpreted as a sign of weakness and distraction, as it was in 2014. For example, the Biden administration could announce plans to station a fifth and eventual sixth attack submarine in Guam. It could also back legislation on Capitol Hill to increase security assistance to Taiwan. Taking these steps during a crisis in Europe would send a powerful signal to Beijing and allied capitals that the United States’ priority on the Pacific perseveres. The Biden administration’s new defense strategy needs to confront the question of overstretch head-on. Given limited resources and the strength of the United States’ adversaries—especially China—the U.S. ability to prevail in a great-power conflict cannot be taken for granted. That’s why the administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Such a force sizing is simply not realistic and would dilute the U.S. military’s focus on the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater, China as its pacing threat, and Taiwan as its pressing scenario. Critically, staying on track in the Pacific requires matching any new military commitments in Europe—even temporary ones—with new resources. The United States must not ask its military to do more with less or pretend that China and Russia can be deterred and confronted on the cheap. Now is not the time to cut defense spending as the Biden administration has proposed. Not when the U.S. military edge relative to China has so dangerously eroded. Not when inflation, aging platforms, rising personnel costs, and the failure to pass a budget on time are sapping the Pentagon’s buying power. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress must provide the military with the sufficient, timely, and predictable funding demanded in these perilous times, and which U.S. service members deserve.

#### Biden is shifting from Ukraine to focus resources on China now

Tharoor ‘22 (Isanan, analyst @ WaPo, “Biden pivots to Asia as Ukraine war rages on,” Washington Post, 5-13-2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/13/asean-southeast-asia-china-biden/>)

The past couple of months marked a rallying moment for the geopolitical West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic. It led to far-reaching, coordinated sanctions on Moscow. It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO, an alliance cast by critics not long ago as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid. By some accounts, the Biden administration alone has mustered more funding for Ukraine in recent weeks than it is committing in the next fiscal year for fighting the planetary peril of climate change. Yet in Washington, there remains a large elephant in the room: China. New battles with the Kremlin have energized the doyens of the city’s foreign policy establishment, many of whom cut their teeth during the Cold War. But the Biden administration is trying to show that it hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” And it recognizes that its contest with China requires closer partnerships well outside Europe. A new push started this week. On Thursday evening, the White House hosted a dinner with eight leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a part of a major U.S.-led summit with the regional bloc. On Friday, the Southeast Asian delegations are slated to continue discussions at the State Department before a plenary session with President Biden. Next week, Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India. U.S. officials recognize that a decade of talk about a strategic “pivot” to Asia has yet to yield concrete results. “Several administrations in succession in the United States have tried … to launch more fundamental efforts, policies, frameworks in Asia, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and found themselves stymied or misdirected or directed toward other pursuits,” said Kurt Campbell, the White House’s lead official on Indo-Pacific policy, in a speech this week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “And that has been something that I think all of us are deeply aware of in the formulation and execution of policy.” The Biden administration aims to show that its heavy involvement in the Ukraine war is not a distraction from its priorities to the East. But it is climbing an uphill road with ASEAN countries, where many officials lament a lack of American engagement, especially during the years of the Trump administration.

## Links

### L – Generic

#### Increasing security cooperation locks in dependence and makes challenging China impossible – status quo is temporary, the aff makes in permanent.

Wertheim ’22 (Stephen, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” March 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/)-mikee

In the long run, the United States can’t contain both Russia and China. Europe’s resolute opposition to Putin’s war provides an opening for a strategic shift. When a great power takes a gamble, the world shakes. By ordering an attack on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed a chain of reactions whose endpoint no one can yet foresee. Already apparent, however, is one consequence for the United States. Overstretched to begin with, America has just seen its strategic burden increase. Just as suddenly, however, a new solution is coming into view: Europe is ready to take on greater military duties. Before the war, many Americans, including some political leaders, had determined to be more realistic about their country’s strategic ambitions in an increasingly competitive world. Sensibly, President Biden had sought to stabilize relations with Russia and reduce U.S. war-making in the greater Middle East while turning attention and resources toward managing a rising China. But Putin’s Russia has refused to be sidelined. By invading Ukraine, it has caused NATO’s eastern flank, with four countries bordering Russian territory, to demand reinforcements — and the United States has risen to the task. Biden has sent 14,000 American troops to Europe since the crisis began, bringing the total to 100,000. Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due. America’s domestic divisions must also be taken seriously. The Republican front-runner for 2024, former president Donald Trump, initially called Putin’s invasion of Ukraine a “genius” move. How reliable, then, is America’s commitment to Europe? Even in better times, it would remain uncertain whether a U.S. president would place the American people in peril for the sake of repelling a Russian attack in Eastern Europe — for example, potentially trading a nuclear attack on Boston to protect the Estonian capital of Tallinn. Under present circumstances, it would be folly for Europe to trust its fate to doubtful promises, and wise for the Biden administration to Trump-proof American alliances. Today, even smaller European countries like Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are ferrying arms to Ukraine, while perpetually neutral Switzerland is freezing Russian assets. Yet proclamations of a “new Europe” are premature. If the United States does not galvanize and incentivize its allies to step up, they are unlikely to make the profound changes needed to build a European security architecture that can last. In the coming months, the administration could formulate a multiyear but time-limited plan to transition to a European defense led by Europe. Such a plan would build on the work of the British-Baltics-Polish coalition that reinforced Eastern Europe before the war, but it must also involve the major Continental powers of Germany and France, whose participation is key to forging a durable order. By publicizing the plan, and doing so while passions remain high, the United States and its allies could create a credible commitment on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe would have to act quickly to redress its strategic deficits relative to Russia, which are real but too often exaggerated. The European members of NATO already possess around two dozen armored and mechanized brigades, enough to make a Russian offensive difficult in the early stages and allow Europe to prevail through its overwhelming economic and demographic advantages. The most urgent task is to improve the readiness and sustainability of European forces. German determination and funding will go a long way toward that end. In particular, Europe must develop certain critical capabilities, such as surface-to-air missile batteries, combat-support assets, and air-refueling systems — all essential for high-end operations, and at present possessed mostly by the United States. During the transitional period, U.S. military would continue to provide command-and-control functions and logistics support so as not leave an opportunity for Moscow to exploit. The Biden administration would, however, begin to shift command of NATO to European leadership, and deepen its support for E.U. defense efforts, which previous administrations sought to suppress. As European forces steps up, the United States could bring most of its personnel home, with some air and naval forces remaining. Europe would also need to grow its defense-industrial base, both to develop cutting-edge technologies and to create enduring political support for higher spending. Since 2017, the E.U. has implemented promising new measures to increase and coordinate investments in defense. If the E.U. could borrow 750 billion euros to fund pandemic recovery, it could borrow billions more to finance new defense capabilities. Here, as elsewhere, the United States would have to take concerned action just to keep from getting in its allies’ way. To allow European industry to grow, the White House and Congress ought to be less aggressive in facilitating sales of U.S.-made military equipment. The profits of domestic contractors should yield to the vital defense needs of the United States and Europe. In another era, the prospect of letting Europeans lead Europe’s defense would have caused an outcry in some quarters of Washington. Even today, it will cause controversy. But political reality suggests it is necessary. Biden has a once-in-a-generation chance to realign America’s strategic priorities while demonstrably strengthening Europe’s defenses. By doing so, he could inspire bipartisan unity. He could forge a path that his successors could follow, regardless of party or personality, by building a Europe-led, U.S.-supported order to preserve the next decades of peace and prosperity across the Atlantic.

### L – Budget Resources

#### Security cooperation with NATO trades off with commitments to Asian allies

Bowne ’18 (Andrew, Major, Judge Advocate in the US Air Force, “Defending The New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against The Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation,” *Military Law Review*, 226.3)//BB

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise amount of expenditures the United States commits directly to NATO, estimates by RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) place the total costs of keeping U.S. forces in key industrial nations at less than $10 billion a year, or less than two percent of the total defense budget.58 While the United States increased defense spending by over eighty percent since 2001, “virtually none of that increase was generated by NATO commitments.”59 When compared to the defense posture the United States fielded in Europe during the Cold War, the resources currently obligated to defending Europe are remarkably low. In 1990, approximately fifteen percent of the total worldwide active strength was stationed in Europe, whereas only three percent of a significantly smaller total active force remains in Europe in 2017.60 Thus, despite the political rhetoric and fact that the United States spends more on defense than all other NATO members combined, it is clear the actual contribution to NATO is a relatively small portion of the overall U.S. defense budget. It is critical to understand the parameters of the United States’ contribution to NATO because the United States has finite resources, and, since enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, legally binding caps on funding.61 Every dollar spent towards the objectives of NATO is, in theory, a dollar less going to fight the Islamic State or towards the Pacific pivot. However, the misunderstanding of the true costs of the United States’ role in NATO could have dangerous consequences. If the U.S. budgets and plans for NATO operations based on the false premise that it already spends too much and its partners do not contribute enough, U.S. leadership will likely make decisions that adversely affect its own national security interests.

### L – Focus

#### The plan distracts US from deterring China.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

There has been a lot of global media frenzy about Taiwan’s security in recent weeks. Experts have debated what lessons China might be drawing from Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine. Pundits grew excited when President Joe Biden declared in Tokyo that the United States would intervene militarily if Taiwan was attacked. Yet, below this exuberant froth, policy discussions in the United States, Asia, and Europe have remained relatively steady. I have had an opportunity to interact with senior officials and diplomats from all three of these regions in recent weeks, as well as a range of business executives. They all have unanimously said they are paying heightened attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait and thinking methodically through how best to adjust to shifting circumstances. Contrary to what daily newspaper headlines would suggest, though, they are not considering radical shifts in approach. They are responding to evolving circumstances by doing the equivalent of adjusting a light dimmer rather than flipping a light switch​. Some American experts fear that Ukraine will distract the U.S. from preparing for the principal arena of potential conflict — Asia. They argued early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that the United States should not allow itself to get bogged down in a European conflict that did not implicate America’s vital interests. They suggested instead that the United States should accelerate its transition in focus and military resources to the Indo-Pacific and strengthen America’s deterrent posture against China.

#### US leadership in Europe undermines effective deterrence of China

Mearsheimer ’22 (John, Professor of Political Science at U Chicago, “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine,” The New Yorker, March 1, 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine>)//BB

I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today. What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy? We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

### L – Cyber

#### The plan would demand significant resources and attention – guarantees a trade-off.

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in *Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis,* December 2020, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf>)-mikee

Effective cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment. For example, technical cyber threat information sharing is not merely a matter of adopting a technical standard and installing software. It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes. Similarly, consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavour; organisations must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes. Absent a long-term commitment from organizational leadership, sharing usually withers after an initial burst of enthusiasm. Cyber security should take on the same status as other business enablers, such as accounting, legal affairs, and communications; like these areas, cyber security should be a function that all organisations budget for and sustain over the long-term. Cyber threat information sharing has bedevilled the cyber security community for at least two decades. Faulty assumptions have prevented this fundamentally sound concept from achieving its potential. But while information sharing is a tough problem, it is not an insoluble one. If the cyber security community adopts different underlying assumptions for information sharing then the volume, quality, and utility of the exchanged information can increase. In turn, more effective, relevant information sharing will enable defenders to better understand and anticipate adversaries, develop mechanisms to disrupt adversary activities more strategically, and raise the level of cyber security across the digital ecosystem. Under these circumstances, cyber threat information sharing can finally live up to its promise to enable better cyber security for everyone. For NATO, updating programmes to reflect these revised information sharing assumptions would require significant changes to current operations. First, overcoming the technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers to sharing relevant, actionable information across member countries and economic sectors will require sustained attention, prioritisation, and funding from NATO’s senior leadership. Absent such attention, the barriers will likely prove insurmountable. Second, NATO should build on its existing MISP [Malware Information Sharing Platform] use to create a more comprehensive system of information sharing that broadens the types of information shared and widens the number of recipients. Third, NATO should consider how to better leverage industry for technical information, while enriching that information with government-derived information about context, attribution, and intent. If NATO shifted its approach to information sharing as suggested, the Alliance would have the opportunity to assume a leadership position in this area. If not, NATO will continue to struggle to make information sharing live up to its promise.

#### NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger ‘16 (David, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html)//BB>

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

#### The plan is resource intensive. It would require long and drawn-out negotiations

Lonergan and Moller ‘22 (Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year. “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829>)

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.

#### Enhanced cybersecurity requires modified procurement standards. Makes all weapons more expensive

Schneier and Wheeler ‘21 (Bruce, fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, and Tarah, information security executive, social scientist in the area of international conflict, author, and poker player. “Hacked drones and busted logistics are the cyber future of warfare,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/hacked-drones-and-busted-logistics-are-the-cyber-future-of-warfare/)//BB>

An updated GAO report from earlier this year found some improvements, but the basic problem remained: “DOD is still learning how to contract for cybersecurity in weapon systems, and selected programs we reviewed have struggled to incorporate systems’ cybersecurity requirements into contracts.” While DOD now appears aware of the issue of lack of cybersecurity requirements, they’re still not sure yet how to fix it, and in three of the five cases GAO reviewed, DOD simply chose to not include the requirements at all. Militaries around the world are now exploiting these vulnerabilities in weapons systems to carry out operations. When Israel in 2007 bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor, the raid was preceded by what is believed to have been a cyber attack on Syrian air defenses that resulted in radar screens showing no threat as bombers zoomed overhead. In 2018, a 29-country NATO exercise, Trident Juncture, that included cyberweapons was disrupted by Russian GPS jamming. NATO does try to test cyberweapons outside such exercises, but has limited scope in doing so. In May, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-general, said that “NATO computer systems are facing almost daily cyberattacks.” The war of the future will not only be about explosions, but will also be about disabling the systems that make armies run. It’s not (solely) that bases will get blown up; it’s that some bases will lose power, data, and communications. It’s not that self-driving trucks will suddenly go mad and begin rolling over friendly soldiers; it’s that they’ll casually roll off roads or into water where they sit, rusting, and in need of repair. It’s not that targeting systems on guns will be retargeted to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; it’s that many of them could simply turn off and not turn back on again. So, how do we prepare for this next war? First, militaries need to introduce a little anarchy into their planning. Let’s have wargames where essential systems malfunction or are subverted—not all of the time, but randomly. To help combat siloed military thinking, include some civilians as well. Allow their ideas into the room when predicting potential enemy action. And militaries need to have well-developed backup plans, for when systems are subverted. In Joe Haldeman’s 1975 science-fiction novel The Forever War, he postulated a “stasis field” that forced his space marines to rely on nothing more than Roman military technologies, like javelins. We should be thinking in the same direction. NATO isn’t yet allowing civilians not employed by NATO or associated military contractors access to their training cyber ranges where vulnerabilities could be discovered and remediated before battlefield deployment. Last year, one of us (Tarah) was listening to a NATO briefing after the end of the 2020 Cyber Coalition exercises, and asked how she and other information security researchers could volunteer to test cyber ranges used to train its cyber incident response force. She was told that including civilians would be a “welcome thought experiment in the tabletop exercises,” but including them in reality wasn’t considered. There is a rich opportunity for improvement here, providing transparency into where improvements could be made. Second, it’s time to take cybersecurity seriously in military procurement, from weapons systems to logistics and communications contracts. In the three year span from the original 2018 GAO report to this year’s report, cybersecurity audit compliance went from 0% to 40% (those 2 of 5 programs mentioned earlier). We need to get much better. DOD requires that its contractors and suppliers follow the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process; it should abide by the same standards. Making those standards both more rigorous and mandatory would be an obvious second step. Gone are the days when we can pretend that our technologies will work in the face of a military cyberattack. Securing our systems will make everything we buy more expensive—maybe a lot more expensive. But the alternative is no longer viable.

### IL – Zero-Sum

#### Resources are zero-sum, the plan forces a trade-off.

Blackwill and Fontaine ‘22, (Robert is senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Richard is Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Bloomberg, March 8, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-09/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-should-slow-not-stop-u-s-pivot-to-china)-mikee

Until recently, a wide bipartisan consensus held that China, not Russia, represented America’s greatest national security challenge and that Asia, not Europe, was the region in which this century’s fortunes would be determined. The long-delayed “Pivot to Asia” would recognize these realities, as the U.S. devoted greater attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Over the next several years, the U.S. must adopt a slower, less-intense pivot to Asia than it intended before Putin's war. That is, however, preferable to no pivot at all, or to pretending that the crisis in European security does not alter American plans. The long game will be all-important.

#### The aff requires a forced choice to sacrifice resources and focus needed to defend Taiwan

Colby 22, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (Eldridge, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority,” *TIME Magazine*, <https://time.com/6152096/us-support-ukraine-china-priority/>)

How should America respond to Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine? This is a question of immense importance. Right now, there is more heat than light in the discussion. Given the momentous stakes, Americans must respond to this crisis with clarity of mind and sobriety. Moscow’s invasion is likely to be a hinge point in history. If nothing else, it lays to rest the idea that history is over, that power politics and the threat of war are gone from the developed areas of the world. This is sad, but it is a reality. In developing our response to Russia’s brazen act, we must face and adapt to this reality. For too long, we have discounted the hard facts of international politics. But now America must look at the world situation much more soberly and strategically, proceeding from these hard facts rather than ignoring them or wishing them away. Above all, our response must be strategic—it must match our response to the threats we face in light of our resources and the risks we are willing to take on. The reality is that we face multiple serious threats in different parts of the world. The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence. So far this is familiar. Less familiar but absolutely critical is the fact that we do not have a military large or capable enough to fight major wars against Russia and China in even roughly concurrent timelines. It is true that Europe is mainly a land theater and the Western Pacific is mainly a maritime one. But many of the things our forces would need to defeat Russia or China are needed in both theaters—like heavy penetrating bombers, attack submarines, advanced munitions, air defenses, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Even certain assets once thought most appropriate or necessary for Europe may well play a critical role in a fight against China, such as Army long-range missiles and artillery. These and other capabilities like them would be just as vital for beating back a Russian assault as they would be for denying a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan—and are already in short supply. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that we can solve easily, quickly, or cheaply. We should seek to redress it, but, even if we muster the will, it will take years and a significantly larger defense budget to build more of the things we need to fight a major war, like penetrating heavy bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In the meantime, what we do have can only be used in one place at a time. A missile used in Europe can’t be used in Asia, and a bomber lost over Europe will take years to be replaced. We do also have an unparalleled network of allies. But a similar problem confronts us here. In theory our alliance network is far stronger than the threats we face. But in reality few of our allies have significant militaries, and it will take those that don’t significant time to develop their armed forces even if they gather the resolve. Over the long term, then, our strategy should be clear. We should reshape our military to field far more of the kinds of systems needed to fight a great power war and, with a few exceptions like sustaining our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, dispense with those elements that are ill-suited for it. Meantime, we should press and encourage our allies, especially Japan, Germany, and Taiwan, to build up their conventional defenses, and fully enable those, like Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, willing to do more for their and others’ defense. But this strategy will take time to bear fruit. This is the strategy the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for—yet four years later, due to factors ranging from inertia through political and bureaucratic resistance to allied footdragging, we still have a long way to go. In the coming years, then, we face what Henry Kissinger called “the necessity for choice.” We don’t have enough of the right military might to cover all the threats to our interests. So we must prioritize. This is far from unprecedented. The U.S. and Britain faced this dilemma in 1941, and elected a “Europe first” strategy, prioritizing defeating much stronger Nazi Germany before Imperial Japan. Similarly today, America must prioritize addressing the threat China poses in Asia. Asia is the world’s “decisive theater” and China by far the most powerful other state in the world. If China attains its goal of becoming dominant over Asia, it will control over half of the global economy. Americans’ fundamental liberties and prosperity will suffer grievously. This is the most dangerous outcome for Americans, and preventing it must be the priority of our foreign policy. In practical military terms, this means that we must ensure enough of the right military forces—bombers, submarines, munitions, ISR, and the like—are ready and available to defend Taiwan, and on relatively short notice. Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this. And, crucially, this is a problem right now. We don’t know Beijing’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to seize Taiwan. But we do know that America’s ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has eroded very substantially in recent years, that it is continuing to erode, and that Beijing’s perceptions of its ability to take the island would rise dramatically if it knew we had expended or tied down critical parts of our military in or for Europe. In other words, we are in or very close to the window where a successful Chinese attack on Taiwan is possible, and we must hedge against this risk.

#### Washington has internalized a zero-sum relationship between Europe and Asia. They will trade-off resources, even if it’s not legally required.

Simon, Desmaele and Becker ‘21, \*head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, \*\*doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, \*\*\*currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Simon.pdf)//BB>

First, to influence and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, Washington has traditionally relied on a strategy of forward military presence coupled with economic and diplomatic engagement. But US resources are limited, and increasing demand for them in Asia raises new questions about whether Washington can preserve a favorable European regional balance at a lower cost than in the past. In this context, Washington must consider how much influence it is willing to cede to European actors, including Germany, Russia, Britain, France and the European Union (EU). Second, as Europe becomes a secondary theater in US grand strategy, Washington is compelled to ensure that Europe’s key powers and institutions support US interests when it comes to competition with Beijing, or at least that they do not undermine US efforts in this regard. In reframing its relationship with Europe, the US is paying increasing attention to Europe’s positions toward China and Asia. Washington recently warned Europeans, for example, about China’s efforts to leverage investments and trade to gain technological and related strategic advantages relative to the United States.9 China-related considerations are also likely to gain relevance in the context of America’s calculations vis-à-vis Russia, a country that can play a direct—if limited—strategic role in China’s immediate periphery: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. For now, the US continues to look at Russia (primarily) through a European lens and worries about Moscow’s potential to threaten US regional interests and upset the European balance. However, as competition with China becomes the focus of US grand strategy, Washington may increasingly consider how Russia can affect that competition—whether through its relationship with China, its ability to strain the European balance of power, or its propensity to create challenges elsewhere in the world. While it is certainly conceivable that the United States could retain such overwhelming advantages vis-à-vis all its peer competitors, or that China’s rise could organically slow or reverse, the US does not seem to be betting on either scenario.10 The centrality of China in US grand strategy appears to be structural, driven by the broader eastward shift in the distribution of global economic power. It is therefore unsurprising that as the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with China’s rise, it adjusts strategy in other regions accordingly. The fact that Washington has labelled China as a “global” competitor makes it difficult to isolate SinoAmerican competition in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific area from what happens in other theaters, particularly Europe.

## Impacts

### ! – Asia War

#### Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, *American Interest*, “Obama in Asia,” <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/>)

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.  East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here.  American objectives in this region are clear.  While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, [Kaiser Wilhelm-like](http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/09/26/in-the-footsteps-of-the-kaiser-china-boosts-us-power-in-asia/) dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China.  We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free.  Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure.  Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia.  The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there.  The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well.  This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are.  It is where the worst environmental problems exist.  It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well.  Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores.  East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved.  The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam.  From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns.  That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

### China Outweighs

#### China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia

Colby ’20 (Eldridge, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis, https://www.themarathoninitiative.org/2020/12/how-nato-manages-the-bear-and-the-dragon/)

Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent? Elbridge Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.

### Taiwan Risk High

#### Threat of Taiwan invasion is high now – uncertainty and force capabilities means the US needs to be extra committed.

Toosi & Seligman ’22 (Nahal and Lara are Politico reporters, “The U.S. overestimated Russia’s military might. Is it underestimating China’s?” 06/15/2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/15/china-military-00039786)-mikee

Island of uncertainties Under China’s President Xi Jinping, who has consolidated power within the communist apparatus to an unusual degree, Beijing has been increasingly clear that it wants to bring Taiwan under control of the mainland by 2050, and that any threat to that goal could lead it to use force. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions. ... And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Adm. Philip Davidson, then-commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress last year. Beijing’s statements suggest that China could move on Taiwan at any moment, if it believes the conditions are right. “It’s dangerous to say that 2027 or 2030 or 2035 is some heightened date,” the former Defense Department official said. “You are actually ignoring the risk that tomorrow something could happen.” An invasion of Taiwan would likely begin with an air assault and amphibious landing, analysts and former officials say, but what happens next is a mystery. How long can China continue launching missiles and aircraft, for example? What capacity does Beijing have to maintain and repair equipment in a fight? How will China’s military fare if the conflict turns into urban warfare? How will Beijing grapple with mass casualties or displaced civilians? Unlike with Russia, which has been fighting in Ukraine and Syria over the past decade, there is less recent history to draw from for China. Beijing has not fought a war since 1979, and its air force has not participated in a major conflict since 1958, Garafola noted. “The harder thing to measure, of course, is how they would perform in combat in a complex environment where things don’t go entirely as planned,” said Randy Schriver, a top Asia policy official in the Pentagon during the Trump administration. “It’s questionable that, even as they’ve improved their training, whether or not they are training at complex enough levels to be able to handle unintended or unknown developments.” The United States also has limited insight into how the different arms of the Chinese military apparatus would work together in a high-end campaign, analysts said. The U.S. military long ago began emphasizing “jointness” in its training exercises and operations, meaning integrating its air, sea, space, maritime and cyber capabilities. It’s unclear Beijing can do the same in a real-world operation. “There’s a lot of talk about cyber — we know how they use cyber for theft of information and intelligence, but we know less about how they might use cyber integrated into a war plan,” Schriver said. One area which the current reviews of foreign military assessments are paying close attention to is China’s supply lines if it attacks Taiwan, the Biden administration official said. Taiwan is an island, making resupplying invading forces a tougher task than what Russia faces in its overland routes to Ukraine. China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives across the Pacific also offer puzzles for American officials wondering if the efforts have a military angle. Chinese military officers and diplomats recently gathered alongside their Cambodian counterparts for a groundbreaking ceremony at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. China has pledged to upgrade the base, which sits near the South China Sea, in exchange for the Chinese military having access to part of it, a Chinese official confirmed to The Washington Post. Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian said at the ceremony that the work was “not targeted at any third party, and will be conducive to even closer practical cooperation between the two militaries.” The deal recalls Beijing’s 2017 establishment of a logistics port in Djibouti in eastern Africa, a facility leased close to an American base in the tiny country at the mouth of the Red Sea. China has about 2,000 troops manning the base, which is a logistics hub for wider Chinese interests on the continent. Satellite image from shows a Cambodian naval base. This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows a Cambodian naval base in Ream, Cambodia, April 25, 2022. Cambodian and Chinese officials will break ground this week on the expansion of a port facility that the U.S. and others have worried will be used by Beijing a naval outpost on the Gulf of Thailand. | Planet Labs PBC via AP Photo Wrong now, right later? The U.S. intelligence community’s misjudgments of Russian and Ukrainian troops’ performance stood in stark contrast to what appeared to be far more accurate forecasts about Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade and some of the disinformation tactics he intended to use. The United States appears to have better intelligence about top-level Russian decision-making than it has for China. President Joe Biden and his aides also chose to publicize some of the intelligence in a bid to thwart Putin’s plans. FBI Director Christopher Wray testifies during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing about worldwide threats. When asked about why one aspect of the intelligence — Putin’s intentions — was right, while the other — his military’s battlefield performance — was off-base, some U.S. and foreign officials said it’s likely because it’s a safer bet for an analyst to forecast that a military will do well and be wrong than to say it will do poorly and be wrong. And until that military is actually fighting, it’s impossible to know with absolute certainty how it will do. “You err on the side of caution when it comes to defense intelligence,” James Cleverly, a top British official, said when POLITICO asked about the issue earlier this year. Putin appeared to believe he could quickly take out Ukraine’s government, while his troops would be greeted as liberators as they stormed the whole country. His entire battle plan appeared premised on such notions. But in the face of Western-backed Ukrainian resistance, he’s had to recalibrate, focusing on Ukraine’s east and south for now. Some Russia-focused analysts, while acknowledging that early expectations that Moscow would defeat Ukraine quickly were wrong, say that, as the war drags on, Russia could get its act together and ultimately prove correct some of their predictions about its capabilities. “We overestimated the Russian military, but the jury is still out on the lessons from this war,” said Michael Kofman, a Russia analyst with CNA. If anything, the United States should avoid the trap of underestimating Chinese abilities after overestimating that of the Russians, some foreign affairs hands say. During the hearing earlier this year, senators asked Haines and Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, what lessons China was taking away from Russia’s war in Ukraine. “We’re not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking away from this conflict right now. We would hope they would be the right ones,” Berrier said, adding later that one lesson could be “just how difficult a cross-strait invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be.” Sen. Josh Hawley, however, wondered if that was optimistic. After all, efforts to deter the Russian invasion didn’t work. “We pretty dramatically overestimated the strength of the Russian military,” the Missouri Republican acknowledged. He added, however, “Don’t you think we’re dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in China?” To which Berrier replied: “I think China is a formidable adversary.”

### ! – Taiwan

#### Taiwan draws-in everyone – extinction

Hunkovic ‘9 [Lee J, 2009, American Military University, 09 “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able tosuccessfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### China Revisionist

#### Chinese goals require violently securing global domination – domestic policy and government documents prove – evaluate internal Chinese affairs before the aff’s empirics because it’s impossible to explain why China acts without understanding their mindset.

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2019 has not been a good year for China. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ambitions and the Communist Chinese Party’s imperious means to achieve them have become transparent. The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is illustrative. Two Chinese actions defined this past year's regional news cycle. First, China's reaction to Hong Kong's peaceful pro-democratic protests escalated to a full-scale military crackdown. The Beijing Government deployed 12,000 People's Armed Police – a 1.5-million strong army dedicated to internal security – to the island, beating protestors and besieging the democracy movement's university strongholds. Most remarkable has been the resilience of average Hong Kongers. The opposition lacks a designated leader and organizational structure, a clear demonstration of widespread rage at China's dishonoring the Basic Law that protects Hong Kong's freedoms and to which the CCP agreed before Hong Kong's sovereignty passed from the U.K. to China in 1997. Second, China has escalated its campaign against Uighur Muslims in the country's West. Internal party documents have confirmed that Premier Xi and his confidants have no qualms about executing the largest instance of ethnically-targeted mass internment since the Holocaust. Beijing has constructed a Stasi-style police state in Xinjiang and deported 1.5 million Uighurs to "reeducation" camps. The more horrific accusations – that China harvests organs from Uighur men, and that Chinese soldiers are raping the wives of interned Uighur men in the form of extermination-by-forced-breeding – are unconfirmed. However, the situation merits a serious independent examination of these accusations. Only with the context of these events, combined with China’s escalating aggression towards the United States and its Pacific allies, can the importance of Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan be grasped. Global dominance is China’s ultimate ambition. A toxic combination of paranoia and imperial longing propels China’s rulers – reclaiming the Middle Kingdom’s place at the center of the world requires destroying America’s international position, while—as China’s rulers apparently believe—its security entails monopolizing the Western Pacific, eliminating any ethnically or politically distinct entities within China, and ensuring Chinese access to resources and markets abroad. Chinese pressure on Taiwan, therefore, stems from the same desires that prompt repression in Hong Kong and savagery in Xinjiang. Moreover, Taiwan poses a unique problem for Beijing. Its links with the United States make it a potential forward operating base for China’s adversaries, frustrating Beijing’s ambitions to control the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s democratization after decades of military rule proves that it can govern itself without Beijing’s imperial management. Bringing Taiwan to heel, therefore, is the inexorable result of China’s ambitions. Its actions this past year demonstrate Beijing’s multi-spectrum approach to achieving this end.

#### Official doctrines prove China is aggressive.

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(Bradley and Lianchao, “The ‘Xi Doctrine’: Proclaiming and Rationalizing China’s Aggression”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/%E2%80%98xi-doctrine%E2%80%99-proclaiming-and-rationalizing-china%E2%80%99s-aggression-62402)//GA

Using the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe, delivered a sharp message to the United States, which may be termed the “Xi Doctrine” on China’s use of force, after Chinese premier Xi Jinping. Wei declaring both China’s resolve to aggress to advance its interests and a rationalization for the use of force. Wei’s de facto threat of war should not be lost in his nuances, deliberate ambiguity, or in translation. His remarks were so bellicose that the world has noticed, as was certainly intended by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Empirical evidence of China’s aggression is increasingly common, from its attempt to dominate the South China Sea, the neo-imperialist effort to gain control of states through the Belt and Road Initiative, to its technological imperialism to control 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. What is rather less frequent are statements from high-level Chinese officials proclaiming the country’s intent to be aggressive and offering an attempted legitimizing principle justifying that aggression. While much of the content of Wei’s remarks were in keeping with the gossamer pronouncements on China’s peaceful intentions, as well as a paean to Xi Jinping’s leadership, they still conveyed that China is ready and willing to resort to war if the United States stands in its way of global expansion; and they made clear that China must go to war, or even a nuclear war, to occupy Taiwan. Specifically, there are four elements that comprise the Xi Doctrine and are indications of China’s signaling its willingness to use force. The first component is a new and alarming proclamation of the undisguised threats to use force or wage an unlimited war. China is becoming bolder as its military power grows. This is evidenced in Wei’s muscular remarks on the People’s Republic of China’s approach against Taiwan, his explicit statement that China does not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and his effort to deter the United States and its allies from intervention should an attack occur. Wei forcefully stated: “If anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but must go to war, and must fight for the reunification of the motherland at all costs.” “At all cost” means that China will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons or launching another Pearl Harbor to take over Taiwan. This is a clear warning of an invasion. Second, the Xi Doctrine legitimizes territorial expansion. Through his remarks, Wei sought to convince the rest of the world that China’s seizure of most of the South China Sea is an accomplished fact that cannot be overturned. He made bogus accusations, which included blaming the United States for “raking in profits by stirring up troubles” in the region. He insisted that only ASEAN and China must resolve the issue. He claimed that China’s militarization on South China Sea islands and reefs were an act of self-defense. Should this be allowed to stand, then the Xi Doctrine will set a perilous precedent of successful territorial expansion, which will further entice China and jeopardize the peace of the region. Third, the doctrine targets the United States as a cause of the world’s major problems and envisions a powerful China evicting the United States from the region. Wei obliquely identified the United States as the cause wars, conflicts, and unrest, and sought to convey that the United States will abandon the states of the South China Sea (SCS) when it is confronted by Chinese power, a typical divide and conquer strategy used by the CCP regime. The Xi Doctrine’s fourth element is the mendacity regarding China’s historical use of force and current actions. While the distortions of history were numerous, there were three major lies that should be alarming for the states of the region and the global community. First, Wei said that China had never invaded another country, which is a claim so transparently false it can only be a measure of the contempt he held for the audience. China has a long history of aggression, including against the Tibetans and Vietnamese, and perhaps soon against the Taiwanese. Second, Wei argued that hegemony does not conform to China’s values when, in fact, China proudly was Asia’s hegemon for most of the last two thousand years. Lastly, he claimed that the situation in the SCS is moving toward stability—from China’s perspective this stability is caused by its successful seizure of territory. In fact, the SCS is far less stable as a result of China’s actions. Efforts to counter this grab are denounced by Wei as destabilizing, which is a bit like a thief accusing you of a crime for wanting your property returned. Wei’s belligerent rhetoric is an indication that the CCP regime faces deep external and internal crises. Externally, the Trump administration has shocked the CCP with the three major steps it has taken. First, it has shifted the focus of the U.S. national-security strategy and now identifies China explicitly as its primary rival—abandoning the far more muted policies of previous administrations. Second, Trump has acted on this peer competitive threat by advancing tangible measures, such as arms sales to allies and the ban of Huawei. Third, the administration has made credible commitments to assure partners and allies to counter China’s aggression and bullying. These have unbalanced the CCP regime, and its natural reaction is to bully its way out. Additionally, the CCP regime has perceived that the world today has begun to consider the negative implications of China’s rise, and the United States is determined to prevent what heretofore had been considered China’s unstoppable rise. From the perspective of CCP, conflict is increasingly seen as inevitable and perhaps even imminent. Wei’s bellicosity should be seen in this light, and the PLA is tasked with fighting and winning the war. Internally, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign that selectively targets his political rivalries, and his abandoning the established rules such as term limited of presidency, have introduced deep cleavages into the unity of the regime unity. China’s economic slowdown, made worse by the U.S. trade war, is a fundamental challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. Xi’s repression and suppression of the Chinese people, particularly human-rights defenders, Christians, Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other minorities, have miscarried. Drawing from the pages of unfortunate history, in a classic social-imperialist move, the regime wants to direct these internal tensions outward. At the same time, the nationalistic fervor advanced by the CCP’s propaganda and by the rapid military modernization have made many young militant officers in the PLA overconfident. This is infrequently noticed in the West. They can hardly wait to fight an ultimate war to defeat the arch-enemy. This plainly dangerous mentality echoes the Japanese military’s beliefs before Pearl Harbor. The bellicosity evinced in Wei’s speech is serious and is not bluster intended to deter. The United States cannot meet China’s threat with half-measures, which are likely to further encourage China’s aggressive behavior. The United States must respond to China’s belligerence with greater strength, adamantine determination, and more vigorous diplomatic and military measures. With the Xi Doctrine, China has proclaimed and rationalized its aggression. A Trump Doctrine forged in response has to reveal to all global audiences, most importantly the CCP leadership, the recklessness of the Xi Doctrine and the supreme folly of aggression.

#### A historical legacy of dominance and the way the Chinese view their role in the world confirms revisionism.

Choi 18—Ji Young Choi, associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University (“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84, Available through ProQuest)

"Sino-centrism" that is related to this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China's neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi 2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition (Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow 2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are needed.¶ Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era. Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony. Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011).

## AFF ANSWERS

### Ukraine Thumper

#### Ukraine thumps the link – Biden already losing in Asia.

Townshend and Corben ’22 (Ashley Townshend is director of foreign policy and defense and Tom Corben is a research associate in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. “Op-Ed: War in Ukraine Threatens America's Ability to Counter China,” The Strategist, MAR 16, 2022, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-war-in-ukraine-threatens-america-s-ability-to-counter-china>)

As the United States slides deeper into a proxy war with Russia, Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly concerned about the long-term implications of the Ukraine crisis for America’s power and position in this part of the world. And so they should be. While President Joe Biden’s initial approach to Ukraine struck the right balance of resolve and restraint—marshalling global allies in support of sanctions against Russia and funnelling military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine—the war is now sapping more and more American attention and defence resources. A dangerous tit for tat is taking hold. Washington’s lethal military aid and economy-breaking sanctions signal an investment in the war that could slip beyond Biden’s original articulation of limited interests. Russia’s nuclear threats and increasingly brutal operations have triggered further US involvement, including the deployment of advanced F-35 fighters and expensive Patriot missile-defence systems to NATO frontlines in Eastern Europe, and a massive $13.6 billion Ukraine emergency bill passed by Congress last week. Calls are getting louder for a ‘limited no-fly zone’ which, though rebuffed so far, may become politically harder to resist. All this is understandable given the humanitarian carnage. But hot on the heels of the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s unsettling to watch Washington’s strategic gaze drift, once again, away from a robust "pivot to Asia." As we argue in a new United States Studies Centre report, these developments are especially worrying given that the Biden administration has so far failed to deliver on key defense components of its regional strategy. Senior US officials insist that events in Europe will not see the Indo-Pacific or efforts to balance Chinese power deprioritised. Earlier this month, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, again promised that Washington was capable of sustaining "deep commitments" in both theaters simultaneously, even at great cost, just as it had in the past. But while America can—and must—continue to buttress European security, it doesn’t enjoy the luxury of riches or unchallenged military primacy required to underwrite an expansive global strategy against two great-power rivals. Matching ends with means in the Indo-Pacific—America’s so-called ‘priority theatre’—requires difficult trade-offs between competing priorities, including in Ukraine. A more sustainable division of US and allied defense responsibilities in Europe and Asia is urgently required. Biden understands this and deserves credit for attempting to match US global interests and commitments in his first year. Poor execution aside, his Afghan withdrawal showed a willingness to make tough, politically unpopular trade-offs. His initially restrained approach to the Ukraine crisis suggested he would keep it in global strategic perspective. But Washington won’t be able to sideline Moscow from its foreign policy agenda the way it had hoped. Delays to the publication of the US national defense strategy and national security strategy suggest that Russia is forcing a hurried reassessment of Biden’s global priorities. In a worst-case scenario for the Indo-Pacific, it’s possible these documents will return US military strategy to an equally weighted focus on Asia and Europe—contradicting hard-fought efforts in recent years to make China the Pentagon’s outright priority. This is not a callous point to make. America simply doesn’t have the military resources required to prosecute an effective multi-theater strategy in an era of great-power rivalry. Nor is it spending enough to change this equation: while the 2018 national defence strategy recommended three to five percent real growth in defense spending annually to keep pace with China and Russia, not a single defense budget since has met these targets. Biden’s budget continues this unsatisfactory trend. And in contrast to the stark warnings from top brass at US Indo-Pacific Command, who see conflict with China as a possibility this decade, the administration’s defense budget prioritizes long-term military modernization in anticipation of high-end conflict in the 2030s - leaving the US underprepared to deal with Chinese military coercion over the next few years. Budget shortfalls are mirrored by slow-moving efforts to realign US forces globally. Efforts to empower US allies are even more important as Washington is once again pulled in conflicting global directions. Indo-Pacific allies should advocate for more. As a priority, Australia should caucus with Japan and other close security partners to push for overdue reforms to US export controls on defense technology. Indo-Pacific allies should also press Washington for greater insight and input into its regional military planning. A credible collective defence strategy requires clarity on when, where and how to address shared defence challenges. Biden’s effort to build support among regional allies for a Taiwan contingency is a step in this direction. But while Taiwan is the Pentagon’s "pacing challenge," regional countries face Chinese military coercion across a far wider range of lower intensity scenarios, as China’s intimidation of an Australian military aircraft in the Arafura Sea last month attests. New strategic planning initiatives must reflect these realities. In the end, however, these initiatives can’t change the strategic physics of the Indo-Pacific. A favorable balance of power with China can only be upheld with unprecedented US support. Alliance modernization is a necessary component of this strategy, but it’s not a substitute for a robust US military posture and presence in the Indo-Pacific. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, America’s capacity to deliver an effective defense strategy for the region will depend on its ability to keep its escalating involvement in check and in global strategic perspective.

#### Distraction now and the military is unprepared in Asia

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman 3-8-2022, Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. (“Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/08/nine-lessons-from-ukraine-to-apply-in-the-taiwan-strait/)//BB>

With the world’s attention fixed on the national security and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, a similar disaster is brewing in the Pacific. Taking a page from Putin’s playbook, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, is methodically assembling combat power to coerce or conquer the free people of Taiwan. Preventing that from happening will require Washington to learn the right lessons from the disaster in Ukraine. Among them is the need for Washington to spend less time worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies and more time working to defend threatened democracies before the invasion starts. This is especially critical as U.S. forces are much more likely to be directly involved in a response to coercion against Taiwan. For 25 years, Beijing has pursued a determined strategy featuring military modernization, technological advancements, economic infiltration, cyberattacks and persistent disinformation campaigns. These efforts have focused on building a world-class military, erasing American military supremacy in the seas and skies around Taiwan, and preparing for a potential attack designed to establish CCP dominion over Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States has been distracted elsewhere, unable to focus its strategic and fiscal efforts on the rising power in China. This has been compounded by consistent congressional failures to provide the Pentagon with the timely, sufficient and predictable funding necessary to modernize U.S. forces and maintain sufficient readiness and capacity. Indeed, the Department of Defense has received on-time funding only once in the last 13 fiscal years. Exacerbating these dynamics, Washington has been slow in addressing serious concerns and specific requests for resources identified by Indo-Pacific Command in successive reports to Congress. Just last year, the command again warned that the military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies.

### No Trade-Off

#### No trade-off – the US is and can focus on both.

Garamone ’22 (Jim, Reporter for DOD News, “Austin: How the U.S. Walks, Chews Gum at the Same Time,” June 13, 2022, <https://www.safia.hq.af.mil/IA-News/Article/3062747/austin-how-the-us-walks-chews-gum-at-the-same-time/>)-mikee

The Indo-Pacific is a U.S. national security strategy priority, but the United States is a global power with global interests and responsibilities, and "we are walking and chewing gum at the same time," Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said today in Bangkok. As the United States works toward a free and open Indo-Pacific it also is leading the effort to supply Ukraine with the arms, ammunition and supplies it needs to defend itself against an unprovoked war. Further, the U.S. military has worked to reassure NATO allies with the addition of more than 20,000 U.S. service members in the European theater. At the same time, there are 300,000 service members serving in the Indo-Pacific. The reason the United States can "walk and chew gum at the same time" is because of the unparalleled network of allies and partners. Austin's current trip around the world is an example how the U.S. values and relies on that network of allies. The trip started with a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the command that symbolizes the close bond between the two countries — the North American Aerospace Defense Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. From there, Austin went to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and then to Bangkok, where he conferred with the United States' oldest treaty ally. Austin spoke to reporters at the end of his meetings with Thailand Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Prayut Chan-o-cha to put the trip into perspective. At Shangri-La, Austin delivered a major speech about "the centrality of this region to vital U.S. interests and the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific that we share with our regional allies and partners." And the secretary also used the gathering of defense ministers to participate in bilateral and trilateral meetings with allies and partners. These included Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia and China. The secretary plainly laid out U.S. concerns and proposals for the region. He spoke about the need for communication between China and the United States to lessen the chances of an escalation. He spoke of concerns over China's behaviors as it tries to assert control over international waterways and air lanes. He also said the United States "never shies away from honest competition, but we don't seek conflict, nor do we seek a region that's split into hostile blocks." The dialogue "was an important opportunity to raise our concerns about the potential for instability in the Taiwan Strait and to underscore that our long-standing policy toward Taiwan is unwavering and unchanged," he said. Austin worked with allies to increase cooperation across the region. His stop in Bangkok is another piece of this effort to increase cooperation across the region. The United States military is working with Thailand's forces to modernize the military. Discussions centered on this and increasing the complexity of an already large exercise program headlined by the Cobra Gold series. Now, the secretary will travel to Brussels for the defense ministerial — the last such meeting before the NATO Summit in Madrid that begins June 28. While the ministerial is important "my first order of business will be convening the Ukraine defense contact group for the third time," Austin said. "That's going to be an important opportunity to gather our growing group of partners from around the world to ensure that we're providing Ukraine, what Ukraine needs right now in order to defend against Russia's unjustified, unprovoked assault." The group will also look at what Ukraine will need in the long run to build and sustain defenses. "We'll hear directly from the Ukrainian leaders, led by my good friend and counterpart Oleksii Reznikov, and we'll work to intensify our shared efforts to meet Ukraine's priority requirements to defend itself," he said. The bottom line to all this is that the United States can deal in two theaters and with two competitors and then some. He said the number of operations, exercises and training events that the U.S. has conducted with Indo-Pacific allies and partners over the past year "... is impressive in and of itself." Austin continued, "But by the same time, we've been able to not only to help to unify NATO, we've also led the effort to rapidly rush much needed security assistance to Ukraine with the help of allies and partners," he continued. President Joe Biden has been instrumental in solidifying NATO and other nations opposition to Vladimir Putin's unjust war — first by sharing intelligence openly about Russia's intentions and then in his quick response to the invasion itself, Austin said. "[NATO] is more united than I've seen it, and I've been associated with NATO since … 1975 when Lieutenant Austin first started down that road," he said. "So, we are walking and chewing gum. And we're able to do that because the strong network of alliances and partnerships that we have around the globe."

#### The US can focus on both regions at once

Kroenig ‘22, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Matthew, “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China,” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/)//BB>

As Russia threatens the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, the most consequential strategic question of the 21st century is becoming clear: How can the United States manage two revisionist, autocratic, nuclear-armed great powers (Russia and China) simultaneously? The answer, according to many politicians and defense experts, is that Washington must moderate its response to Russia in Europe to focus on the greater threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. This would be a mistake. The United States remains the world’s leading power with global interests, and it cannot afford to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, Washington and its allies should develop a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia and China at the same time. In recent weeks, Biden has sent several thousand U.S. troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank—and for good reason. A major war in Ukraine could spill across international boundaries and threaten the seven NATO allies that border Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Moreover, if Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in Ukraine, why would he stop there? Putin has shown a clear interest in resurrecting the former Russian Empire, and other vulnerable Eastern European countries—Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states—might be next. A successful Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s territory could mean the end of the Western alliance and the credibility of U.S. security commitments globally. The threat posed by China is also serious. Adm. Philip Davidson, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. This is a war the United States might lose. If China succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would be well on its way to disrupting the U.S.-led order in Asia, with an eye to doing the same globally. Moreover, Russia and China are increasingly working together. As this month’s summit between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows, Moscow and Beijing are forging a closer strategic partnership, including on military matters. These dictators could coordinate dual attacks on the U.S. alliance structure or opportunistically seize on the distraction provided by the other’s aggression. In other words, there is a serious risk of simultaneous major-power wars in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To address this problem, many have proposed answers that simply will not work. The Biden administration initially hoped to put relations with Russia on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, but Putin had other ideas, as the world is now seeing in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Washington does not get to decide how its adversaries sequence their aggression. Others have expressed hope that Washington can peel these powers apart or even align with Russia against China, but these are not realistic solutions. The misguided view gaining the most recent acceptance, however, is that Washington should simply choose the Indo-Pacific over Europe. Politicians and experts argue that the United States lacks the resources to take on both Russia and China. They point to China’s power and Asia’s wealth and argue that Asia should be the priority. While Washington pivots to Asia, wealthy European countries, such as Germany, should step up to provide for NATO’s defense. Indeed, the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, which has been delayed due to the Ukraine crisis, is expected to focus on China without offering a clear solution to the two-front-war problem. A good strategy starts with clear goals—and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. A good strategy, however, starts with clear goals, and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. U.S. interests in Europe are too significant to let them be worked out solely between Putin and the United States’ European allies. Indeed, the European Union, not Asia, is the United States’ largest trade and investment partner, and this imbalance is much starker when China (which the United States seeks greater economic decoupling from), is removed from the equation. Furthermore, China has conducted military exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Competing with China militarily means competing globally, not just in Asia. In addition, Xi is gauging U.S. resolve, and a weak response in Ukraine might make a Chinese move on Taiwan more likely. Moreover, the United States is not France; it is not compelled to make gut-wrenching strategic choices about its national security due to constrained resources. In short, publishing a defense strategy that can only handle one of the United States’ great-power rivals (which is what is expected from the forthcoming national defense strategy) is planning to fail.

### Asia Pivot Bad

#### Pivot to Europe solves Russia war, pivot to Asia causes it

McKinley ’22 (Michael, non-resident senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “It’s Time to Pivot Back to Europe,” Politico, 2-24-2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/its-time-to-pivot-back-to-europe-00011324>)

President Vladimir Putin’s recognition of the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, which opened the door to the wider assault on Ukraine that is now underway, is a game-changer on a historic scale. It underscores, like nothing else, that the drift away from Europe by the United States over the past 20 years in pursuit of wars and priorities elsewhere has been short-sighted. Like 1949, the year in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being, America and its European allies are facing a moment requiring a profound redefinition of their security, political and economic ties. Going forward, a strategic, not tactical, pivot back to Europe should be the driving imperative of American foreign policy. In doing so, it is important to accept reality: Putin called the bluff of the not-very-collected West, which was equivocating by placing only selective sanctions on Russia for its virtual annexation of part of Ukraine. Putin is unlikely to be deterred by a staggered escalation of these measures meant to allow room for him to change course: He is dead set on achieving at least a partial reconstitution of the Russian empire as he sees it and forcing the creation of a new security architecture for Europe. Putin’s words need to be taken seriously instead of being dismissed as ramblings or misleading. For all the lingering suggestions that there is still time for diplomacy, Putin could not have been clearer this week that he was also setting the stage for more aggressive steps in the very near future. He even raised a non-existent nuclear threat to Russia from a NATO-dominated Ukraine and again dismissed Ukrainian national identity as a fiction. Arriving at this point, too many commentators and politicians spent months resorting to dismissive rhetoric about Putin even as he outmaneuvered Western leaders. They belittled Russia — as a declining power, a declining economy and as a nation fearful of democratization on its borders. They argued that the United States and NATO allies could force Putin to rethink his actions — even though there has been no sign of him reconsidering course. Some argued that Putin would not risk war given the likely costs. It is now possible to see the limits of their world view. The inviolability of a nation’s sovereignty and its right to decide its own security alliances have also been presented as self-evident truths. In the case of Ukraine, however, many of us side-stepped uncomfortable questions about why NATO did not invite the country to join, and about the precedents set for Finland and Austria after World War II to ensure their neutrality. A now prophetic article by Henry Kissinger in 2014 makes it clear that something like the neutrality option would have been a more desirable outcome for Ukraine and reflected the reality of Ukraine’s situation. The West will find it difficult to break the momentum that Russia is building, or to reverse the new realities Putin is creating. Russia may not be a colossus, but it remains one of the most powerful countries in the world, with a nuclear arsenal, a modernized military and a serious player in international oil and gas markets. It cannot, in other words, be dismissed only as a “regional power threatening its neighbors out of weakness,” and while it is becoming an outright dictatorship by smothering democracy at home, that is not a central concern in the current crisis. Russia can project its military globally — as its interventions in Syria and elsewhere have shown. It can wage cyberattacks on Europe and the United States with relative impunity. Putin has triumphed in political showdowns with leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and, even as Russia’s relationship with Europe in general turns adversarial, the likes of Serbia and NATO member Hungary appear more sympathetic to Putin. World leaders until last week came to Putin as he limited his own international travel — and gave little away. Russia’s diplomatic fortunes are hardly crumbling elsewhere, as evidenced by a rising entente between China and Russia — aligned in their security interests against perceived Western encroachment. There is another factor at work, and that is that Putin’s view of history, often seen as opportunistic, does appear to be a primary driver of his actions. And it is not his worldview alone. The incorporation of Russian-speaking populations inside neighboring borders after 1991 remains an issue for nationalists in Moscow; and the West has systematically downplayed how NATO expansion since 1997 has looked to a generation of Russian leaders, and not just President Putin. It is not dovish, as a recent New Yorker article suggested, or appeasement as a British defense minister stated, to take these perceptions into account in the current crisis. The deep undercurrents of historical myth drive almost every nation into destructive paths. It is in this context that the United States and its allies have chosen to draw a line in the sand over a further Russian military intervention in Ukraine which has now materialized on a major scale. The relative success of President Joe Biden in preserving a united front with European allies on a gradual escalation of sanctions masks the lingering challenges of fully cohering on strategy. There have been differences between the responses by the United States and Britain on the one hand; the French and the Germans on another; and disparate governments like Italy (opposed to energy sanctions as late as this past weekend) and Hungary (offering veiled sympathy to Russia’s demands). French President Emmanuel Macron until recently was openly discussing the need for a new security architecture for Europe. Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany told national reporters on his return from Moscow that “we just can’t have a possible military conflict over a question that is not on the agenda” regarding Ukraine’s future membership in NATO. As EU foreign ministers met in Brussels this week, there were continued differences between those arguing for “incrementalism” on sanctions like Germany and Italy, and those wanting a more forceful response. There may be greater unity now as the scale of the Russian invasion becomes clear, but the proof will only be evident in the coming days. The allies’ caution in recent days contrasted with President Zelensky’s increasing concern as options close around him. The gathering of senior NATO and EU ministers at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 18-20, as well as the presence of a U.S. delegation led by Vice President Kamala Harris, did not convey the strongest confidence on an agreed approach to Russian aggression. President Zelensky’s speech at the gathering was a searing indictment of the lack of decisiveness of Western nations over the last many years, and Ukrainian ministers were publicly critical of the slow pace of the imposition of sanctions since the recognition of the separatist republics by Russia. Western governments are now at a real, not hypothetical crossroads. The invasion is underway, and Putin would appear to be achieving his long-stated objectives, some of which he began to make clear 15 years ago in a speech to the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He has torn up the 2015 Minsk agreement which was meant to be the foundation for talks between Ukraine and Russia regarding the future of the Donbas. Putin is calculating he can survive sanctions for an indefinite period as he builds a significant war chest of foreign reserves. He is also betting on a swifter and easier military victory in Ukraine than Western analysts are predicting. If either of these scenarios were to hold, NATO, EU and American threats or actions would end up ringing hollow to most of the rest of the world. Putin, in short, means to complete what he has started, and more. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis suggested, Ukraine may not be the end of the story, and Belarus’ renewed and total subservience to Moscow can, in retrospect, be seen as prelude to Putin’s attempt to do the same to Ukraine. In responding to Russia’s expanding aggression in Ukraine, Western nations will build towards ever more severe sanctions. There will be United Nations resolutions and condemnations. Russian oligarchs may lose their right to residence and investment in London and Paris. Nord Stream 2 is being suspended and may be canceled. NATO may be strengthened; European members may finally spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. NATO may accelerate military assistance to Ukraine or arm an insurgency in Ukraine in the future. The broader international community may be galvanized into supporting harsher measures to punish Russia depending on the scale of the conflict. Longer-term, however, the latest developments suggest it is time to rethink the West’s approach to the next phase of dealing with Putin. That will entail recognizing that the security landscape of Europe is being changed as we watch, in real time, and is unlikely to be turned back to what it was any time soon. The response must stop Russia from destroying the post-World War II architecture that has largely preserved peace for 70 years. Doing so will require another historic decision and response. We need to revitalize NATO and the transatlantic economic and political relations which have been weakened for two decades as the United States prioritized Asia, abandoned trade agreements, diverted NATO to fight wars farther afield and allowed allies to take for granted the alliance’s centrality to their own collective defense. In the process, we may rediscover that the future of the United States is still most fundamentally impacted by what happens in Europe.

#### Asia pivot breaks NATO

Lauren Sukin 11-18-2021, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (Lauren, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin, <https://thebulletin.org/2021/11/how-biden-can-patch-european-relations-while-pivoting-to-asia/)//BB>

The US focus on China is controversial, in part, because it comes at a moment when relations between NATO and Russia are severely strained. NATO’s Eastern European members don’t want China to “overshadow” concerns about Russia. Multiple Eastern European states have competed for additional US forces —though to little avail. Poland even offered, in 2018, to name a military base after President Donald Trump. Now, NATO waits for the US Global Posture Review, which will provide guidance on how best to allocate US military resources going forward. The review will be heavily scrutinized. If it re-aligns US military resources towards East Asia, the cracks in NATO may continue to grow.

### Europe Focus Solve China

#### Europe is a key counterbalance against Chinese leadership

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The United States needs Europe to be peaceful because it needs NATO and the EU to be productive. The size of Europe’s economy makes it an important counterbalance to China’s growth. British, French, and Spanish ties with Africa are important in pushing back against China’s growing influence in the continent. European universities still produce stellar research which is crucial in the technological competition with China. Each of Europe’s strengths in a competition with China also makes it an important region in its own right. With three-quarters of a billion people, it is an important trade partner and plays a key role in the American economy. It is home to many U.S. military bases used for important missions, most recently during the evacuation from Afghanistan. Its scientific and technological achievements contribute to American prosperity—the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that the president of the United States and millions of others recieved would not have been made without German partnership. America can’t afford to take Europe for granted anymore. They need us and we need them. The hard part of alliance management is supposed to be responding to the needs, wants, and objectives, and insecurities of the other side. But lately, the United States has had more trouble figuring out what its own needs, wants, and objectives in Europe are—or if it has any at all.

### No China War

#### **No US-China war**

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Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

#### No US-China war – nuclear deterrence and geographic factors

Keck 17 (Zachary, Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, former researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former managing editor of The National Interest, “The 2 Forgotten Reasons China and America Probably Won't Go to War”, The National Interest, 8-26-2017, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-2-forgotten-reasons-china-america-probably-wont-go-war-22061?page=0%2C1>) //ghs-ag

In recent years, many observers have woken up to the fact that a war between the United States and China is not unthinkable. Although this is true, there are still strong pacifying forces. Two factors strike me as the most important. The first, and most obvious one, is that both sides maintain secure nuclear arsenals. As Thomas Schelling and others have pointed out, nuclear weapons are not a game-changer simply because of their massive destructive capabilities. The speed and certainty of nuclear retaliation is just as important. These two characteristics simply aren’t present with conventional weapons. Leaders can delude themselves into thinking their conventional forces, however improbably, will end up victorious in battle. In any case, the consequences of being wrong are far in the future. For instance, Imperial Japanese leaders knew it was a tremendous gamble to take on the United States. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral who planned Pearl Harbor, warned his civilian leadership beforehand: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.” After the American economic embargo, however, Japanese leaders were only faced with bad options: capitulating in the face of American pressure or fighting a more powerful enemy in a likely futile effort. In these circumstances, Tokyo decided to gamble. After all, it was conceivable that America would be so exhausted from fighting Nazi Germany in Europe that it would ultimately sue for peace in Asia, especially in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. Can America and Its Allies "Play Fort" against China Deadly Missiles? While the outcome of conventional wars hinges on a number of unknowable factors, nuclear retaliation is certain. And, unlike with conventional weapons—especially before airplanes and missiles—one doesn’t have to defeat the other side’s military to wreak havoc on its cities. Nuclear weapons can do so immediately. Moreover, as Robert Jervis points out , when two countries with secure, thermonuclear arsenals go to war, “the side that is ‘losing’ the war as judged by various measures of military capability can inflict as much destruction on the side that is ‘winning’ as the ‘winner’ can on the ‘loser.’” This changes the calculation of leaders, and makes it inconceivable that rational leaders would opt for total war. This is not foolproof of course— there is still the possibility that miscalculations, gradual escalation, or the “threats that leave something to chance” will produce an outcome neither side wanted— but it is a strong incentive for peace. While it is widely recognized that nuclear weapons make a U.S.-China conflict less likely, the pacifying effect of geography is often overlooked. Geography works to attenuate tensions in two interrelated ways. First, both China and the United States are massive countries that would be extremely difficult to conquer and occupy. Second, both are separated by the largest ocean on earth, and it is extremely difficult to project power over large bodies of water. As John Mearsheimer has written : “When great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies.” These two geographical factors reduce the intensity of the so-called security dilemma. Despite all their disputes over issues like Taiwan and the East and South China Seas, China and the United States generally do not have to fear that the other side will seek to invade and conquer them. This has usually not been the case for rising and ruling powers that went to war. In many of these instances, the rivals were located on the same continent or even shared a border, which generated significant insecurity and led to conflict. As Mearsheimer again explains , “Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.”

### No Taiwan War

#### PLA doesn’t have the capability to invade Taiwan

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Roaring out of the sky, an F-16V fighter jet lands smoothly to rearm and refuel on an unremarkable freeway in rural Taiwan, surrounded by rice paddies. ¶ In different circumstances, this could be alarming sight. Taiwan's fighter pilots are trained to land on freeways between sorties in case all of the island's airports have been occupied or destroyed by an invasion. ¶ Luckily, this was a training exercise. ¶ There's only really one enemy that Taiwan's armed forces are preparing to resist -- China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). And as China's reputation as an economic and military superpower has grown in recent years, so too has that threat of invasion, according to security experts. ¶ Taiwan has been self-governed since separating from China at the end of a brutal civil war in 1949, but Beijing has never given up hope of reuniting with what it considers a renegade province. ¶ At a regional security conference in June, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said: "If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity." In some shops in mainland China, you can buy postcards and T-shirts emblazoned with patriotic emblems promoting the retaking of Taiwan. ¶ But for seven decades, China has resisted attacking Taiwan partly for political reasons, including the prospect of a US intervention and the potential heavy human toll. But the practical realities of a full-blown invasion are also daunting for the PLA, according to experts. ¶ Ferrying hundreds of thousands of troops across the narrow Taiwan Strait to a handful of reliable landing beaches, in the face of fierce resistance, is a harrowing prospect. Troops would then have a long slog over Taiwan's western mudflats and mountains to reach the capital, Taipei. ¶ Not only that, but China would face an opponent who has been preparing for war for almost 70 years. ¶ At mass anti-invasion drills in May, Taiwan military spokesman Maj. Gen. Chen Chung-Chi said the island knew it had to always be "combat-ready." ¶ "Of course, we don't want war, but only by gaining our own strength can we defend ourselves," he said. "If China wants to take any action against us, it has to consider paying a painful price." ¶ Difficult and bloody ¶ It could be easy to assume that any invasion of Taiwan by Beijing would be brief and devastating for Taipei: a David and Goliath fight between a tiny island and the mainland's military might, population and wealth. ¶ With nearly 1.4 billion people, the People's Republic of China has the largest population in the world. Taiwan has fewer than 24 million people -- a similar number to Australia. China has the fifth largest territory in the world, while Taiwan is the size of Denmark or the US state of Maryland. And Beijing runs an economy that is second only to the United States, while Taiwan's doesn't rank in the world's top 20. ¶ But perhaps most pertinently, China has been building and modernizing its military at an unprecedented rate, while Taiwan relies on moderate US arms sales. ¶ In sheer size, the PLA simply dwarfs Taiwan's military. ¶ China has an estimated 1 million troops, almost 6,000 tanks, 1,500 fighter jets and 33 navy destroyers, according to the latest US Defense Department report. Taiwan's ground force troops barely number 150,000 and are backed by 800 tanks and about 350 fighter aircraft, the report found, while its navy fields only four destroyer-class ships. ¶ Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the PLA has rapidly modernized, buoyed by rises in military spending and crackdowns on corruption in the army's leadership. ¶ "China's leaders hope that possessing these military capabilities will deter pro-independence moves by Taiwan or, should deterrence fail, will permit a range of tailored military options against Taiwan and potential third-party military intervention," according to a 2019 US Defense Intelligence Agency report on China's military. ¶ Yet while China hawks in the media might beat the drum of invasion, an internal China military study, seen by CNN, revealed that the PLA considers an invasion of Taiwan to be extremely difficult. ¶ "Taiwan has a professional military, with a strong core of American-trained experts," said Ian Easton, author of "The Chinese Invasion Threat" and research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, as well as "highly defensible" terrain. ¶ In his book he described an invasion by China as "the most difficult and bloody mission facing the Chinese military." ¶ The plan to take Taiwan ¶ China's Taiwan invasion plan, known internally as the "Joint Island Attack Campaign," would begin with a mass, coordinated bombing of Taiwan's vital infrastructure -- ports and airfields -- to cripple the island's military ahead of an amphibious invasion, according to both Easton and Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies. ¶ At the same time, the Chinese air force would fly over the Taiwan Strait and try to dominate the island's air space. Once the PLA was satisfied it had suitably disabled Taiwan's air and naval forces, Kaushal said soldiers would begin to invade on the west coast of the island. ¶ The island's rocky, mountainous east coast is considered too inhospitable and far from mainland China. ¶ The amphibious invasion needed to put troops on Taiwan, however, could be the biggest hurdle facing the PLA. ¶ In its 2019 report to Congress, the US Department of Defense said China -- which has one of the largest navies in Asia -- had at its command 37 amphibious transport docks and 22 smaller landing ships, as well as any civilian vessels Beijing could enlist. ¶ That might be enough to occupy smaller islands, such as those in the South China Sea, but an amphibious assault on Taiwan would likely require a bigger arsenal -- and there is "no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force," the report said. ¶ That makes it vital for Beijing to neutralize Taiwan's navy and air force in the early stages of an attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "The Taiwanese air force would have to sink around 40% of the amphibious landing forces of the PLA in order to render this sort of mission infeasible," he said. ¶ Essentially, that's only about 10 to 15 ships, he added. ¶ If they did make it across the strait, the PLA would still need to find a decent landing spot for its ships. ¶ China's military would be looking for a landing site both close to the mainland, and a strategic city, such as Taipei, with nearby port and airport facilities. ¶ That leaves just 14 potential beaches, Easton said -- and it's not only the PLA that knows it. Taiwanese engineers have spent decades digging tunnels and bunkers in potential landing zones along the coast. ¶ Furthermore, the backbone of Taiwan's defense is a fleet of vessels capable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles, on top of an array of ground-based missiles, and substantial mines and artillery on the coastline. ¶ "Taiwan's entire national defense strategy, including its war plans, are specifically targeted at defeating a PLA invasion," Easton said. ¶ Chinese troops could be dropped in from the air, but a lack of paratroopers in the PLA makes it unlikely. ¶ If the PLA held a position on Taiwan, and could reinforce with troops from the mainland to face off about 150,000 Taiwan troops, as well as more than 2.5 million reservists, it would have to push through the island's western mud flats and mountains, with only narrow roads to assist them, towards Taipei. ¶ Finally, the mobilization of amphibious landing vessels, ballistic missile launchers, fighters and bombers, as well as hundreds of thousands of troops, would give Taiwan plenty of advance warning of any attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "It's extremely unlikely that the invasion could come as a bolt from the blue," Kaushal added. ¶ There is, of course, one final deterrent to any PLA invasion of Taiwan. ¶ It isn't clear whether or not such an attack by China would spark an intervention by the United States on Taipei's behalf. ¶ Washington has been a longtime ally of the island, selling weapons to the Taiwan government and providing implicit military protection from Beijing. ¶ Easton said that, at present, the US would likely intervene in Taiwan's favor, both to protect investment by US companies on the island and reassure American allies in the region, who are also facing down a resurgent PLA in the East and South China seas. ¶ Collin Koh Swee Lean, research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies' Maritime Security Program in Singapore, said there would also be "immense political consequences" from taking over Taiwan, in the event of a successful China invasion. ¶ "It will likely mean that China will be seen as the bad guy in the neighborhood, who uses force," he said. "It will alienate some regional partners and the good will which China has been trying to build over the years will evaporate. And it will set China on a collision course with the US." ¶ But Taipei isn't taking anything for granted. ¶ On the sidelines of the massive Han Guang drills, Taiwan's Maj. Gen. Chen pointed out the hundreds of spectators who had come out to watch and support the island's military. ¶ "These exercises let people know the national army of the Republic of China is ready," he said. ¶ Taiwan is taking no chances.

#### Trade ties make closer Taiwanese ties with China inevitable

**Chen 19** (Dr. Charles I-hsin Chen is Executive Director of the Institute for Taiwan-America Studies at Washington D.C., The Diplomat, 6-14-2019, "Why the US May Lose Taiwan to Beijing Economically," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/why-the-us-may-lose-taiwan-to-beijing-economically/)SEM

In March 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that China is a threat to the United States. “This is a great power battle and we’re engaged in it across the world,” he added. China now challenges American influence in all aspects, and Taiwan represents a frontier in this hybrid competition. While the island’s security still relies heavily on Washington’s guarantees, there’s a rising risk that the United States may lose Taiwan to Beijing economically. There are three reasons for this trend. A Drifting Taiwan The first is Taiwan’s drift. Taiwan’s trade dependency on the United States was largely replaced by dependency on China after 2001, when both Taiwan and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). The share of Taiwan’s total trade involving the United States halved, falling from 23 percent to 12 percent, from 1998 to 2018, while China’s share doubled from 15 to 31 percent. In January 2017, Taiwan adopted a New Southbound Policy (NSP) attempting to divert the island’s exports away from China and into South and Southeast Asia, but without concrete results. Taiwan’s export reliance on China increased 2 percentage points to 41 percent in 2018, peaking historically at 45 percent that March, while the export share to the 18 countries covered in the NSP decreased by 1 percentage point in the same period. Simply put, this new policy did not work well. Even worse, Taiwan’s global strategy is not leading anywhere. There are two groups of regional integration emerging around Taiwan, but the island is unlikely to enter either. First, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which targets 16 Asia-Pacific countries, including China, would require Taiwan to join as a province of China — a condition Taiwan simply cannot accept. Second is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which includes 11 Trans-Pacific countries, now led by Japan after the withdrawal of the United States. However, China may also block Taiwan by pressuring its partners to veto any Taiwanese bid to join. The alternative for Taiwan to promote its trade relations is to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with major economies. Yet the political issue of the status of Taiwan would halt most negotiations in the first round. Unfortunately, Taiwan’s economy is drifting to the middle of nowhere. A Pulling China The second factor is China’s pull. China’s economic attraction for Taiwan is growing at both the regional and local levels. China’s GDP per capita has increased nine times on a purchasing-power-parity basis since 1990. This formed a strong economic gravity pulling all neighboring economies into China’s orbit — and particularly Taiwan, which is just 100 nautical miles off the mainland’s southeast coast. China now is capable of offering lucrative incentives to convert the loyalty of its commercial allies as the existing economic hegemon — namely, the United States — is in relative decline. For example, some Eurasian leaders in developing or underdeveloped countries may see China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a good opportunity. They may also feel that the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is more accessible than the American-led World Bank in granting big loans for development projects. At the local level, China’s economic influence on Taiwan specifically has become more tangible and comprehensive. Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese investment had been lured by preferential policies from Chinese central and local governments. As of last year, the total amount of Taiwanese investment in China has accumulated to $180 billion — 10 times the Taiwanese investment in the United States in the same period. As a result, over 400,000 Taiwanese quality managers and talents are currently working and living in Chinese cities with their family members. The total number may surpass 2 million people, close to one-tenth of Taiwan’s population. In terms of cross-strait relations, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait resumed warm ties in 2008 and reached 23 agreements during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency. Yet the official channel of dialogue was suspended after President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in May 2016. Beijing began to unilaterally conduct cross-strait affairs without prior consultation or negotiation with Taipei. Even while cross-strait tensions rose, in January 2018, quasi-citizenship was granted to Taiwanese living, studying, or working in China and some national treatments involving subsidies or bank loans were opened to Taiwanese enterprises. Beijing’s carrot-and-stick approach towards Taiwan remains, and the carrot is growing sweeter. A Pushing America Meanwhile, the United States risks pushing Taiwan away. President Donald Trump’s Taiwan policy, if there is one, has been inconsistent between political and economic affairs since 2017. In politics, the United States has strengthened its security commitment to Taiwan to tackle the escalating tension in the Taiwan Strait. The new Taiwan Travel Act, taking effect in March 2018, encouraged more frequent and higher level official exchanges between Washington and Taipei. To maintain Taiwan’s capacity of self-defense, informal notification of a $2 billion sale of 108 M1A2 tanks and weapons was sent to the U.S. Congress in early June. Another, bigger package — possibly including 66 F-16V fighter jets — may also seek Congress’ approval later this year. The Pentagon has further made naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait a new normal to contain Beijing’s maritime aggression. Nonetheless, these policy favors do not apply to the economic field. While economic ties have faded in recent years, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Office did not change its tough attitude toward Taiwan. Its latest annual report reiterated serious concerns over Taiwan’s bans on U.S. pork products and beef products containing ractopamine. Due to this first priority issue, the USTR has suspended regular trade talks since October 2016, and put on hold the initial steps of preparing an FTA with Taiwan. During the APEC summit last November, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence agreed to bring the Taiwanese envoy’s request to restart talks back to Washington but there was no change. Apparently, the USTR is not inclined to compromise on this issue. Another case is even more acute and embarrassing. Taiwan was subjected to Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to the United States starting in March 2018, because Taiwanese steel products were suspected to contain China-made steel. In response, Taiwan resorted to severe measures that restricted its steel products with any content of China-made steel from being exported to the U.S. market. Taipei even launched a self-investigation into dumping and government subsidies focused on select China-made steel products sold in Taiwan from 2015 to 2017. Embarrassingly, these extra efforts were all in vain, and Taiwan was not included on the tariff exemption list. While politicians in Washington have been wooing Taiwan, their economists are sabotaging that effort.

### China Not Revisionist

#### China isn’t revisionist

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In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion. When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27 Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31 Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

### China Not a Threat

#### The US has the overwhelming military advantage

Sawant 12-13-2021 (Mangesh, master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870650/why-china-cannot-challenge-the-us-military-primacy/)//BB>

The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75 According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.

#### The US leads across all military spectrums

Sawant 12-13-2021 (Mangesh, master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870650/why-china-cannot-challenge-the-us-military-primacy/)//BB>

Why China Cannot Challenge the United States People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power in 2020 in the fifth place behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh in the world, due to its lack of fourth-generation fighter planes and high-end drones. In General Shaozhong’s view, China will become the second-largest military power in the world only in 2049, when it celebrates its centennial anniversary.27 The US Military as an Economic Deterrent The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence. The Communist Party of China (CCP) gains its legitimacy from economic development. It is possible that China could target Guam with its small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). However, the use of ICBMs will lead to massive retaliatory strikes by the United States leading to total annihilation of China’s military and economic centers of gravity.28 The USN Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai, obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours. The CCP leadership is inexperienced in nuclear matters as it lacks exposure to a nuclear warfare strategy as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear policy is based on low-level deterrence, “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains small and vulnerable.29 Threatening the United States with 200 nuclear weapons is not an option. Geographically, the United States and China are similar in size. However, China’s economy will be decimated by a few US nuclear weapons, as its critical infrastructure is concentrated on the coastlines and not dispersed like the US infrastructure. A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worth USD 310 billion. The war will result in a decline in industrial production, unemployment, and inflation, causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution. As seen from World War II, the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war, resulting in high employment and industrial growth. It is expensive to be a superpower. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War two and a half millennia ago, “first count the cost.”30 China’s defense budget cannot compete with the combined power of United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States alone spends more on national defense than China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil combined.31 Can China afford it? An arms race will lead to an increase in China’s military spending, affecting its development goals. The Absence of War-fighting Experience The United States has an analytical learning process in place—China does not.32 Lessons learned have been well documented by the US military in the form of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The US military has been documenting lessons learned since as early as the Boxer Revolution during the China campaign.33 The US military has been led by outstanding military generals like George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and David Petraeus, while China always lacked great generals. The world sends its military officers to US military institutions and not China’s military colleges. The PLA strategy is based on Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception. China’s only option is an asymmetric strategy due to its incapability to fight symmetric wars. Chinese scholars have authored books like Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.34 However, China is unable to convert the strategies and tactics mentioned in these books into an executable doctrine. The Lack of Power Projection Power projection capabilities set a superpower apart. From its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been wielding its economic power to compel US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to align with China, which has not been greatly successful.35 China lacks global reach, as it does not have foreign defense treaties or logistical bases abroad equipped with military stockpiles.36 During a war with the United States, soliciting Pakistan’s military support looks difficult, as China’s all-weather friend has been hesitant to cut its military ties with the United States. China is constrained to operate beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled. China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support two to three ships for approximately two weeks.37 The USN’s 68 nuclear-powered submarines have been prowling the world’s oceans displaying naval power, while the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines are unable to do so. Fighter aircraft operating without a package of air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields cannot travel very far. The PLAAF’s capability to target US bases in the Pacific is hindered by a lack of air-refueling capacity. A flight group of eight J-11B Flankers will have to be simultaneously refueled twice by two air-refueling tankers for a seven-hour flight.38 The PLAAF will have to deploy 20 percent of its tanker fleet to refuel the Flankers. The PLAAF has 10 tankers for more than a thousand fighter aircraft, while the USAF has 625 tankers for 1,956 fighter aircraft.39 The tankers will be the prime targets for the USN potentially putting the Flankers at risk. China’s only existing bomber, the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii—even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases, as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers, as they cannot match its range.40 An Archaic Military Less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces, air force, and air defense forces and 55 percent of its submarine fleet were modern in 2011.41. Subsequently, nothing much has changed, as a substantial percentage of China’s military remains obsolete.42 China’s military faces institutional shortcomings arising from obsolete command structures, low quality of personnel, and corruption.43 The military has weaknesses centering on supporting capabilities such as logistics, inadequate airlift, and deficient air defense and antisubmarine warfare.44 The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence.45 China’s military training and operational capabilities and competences do not match US standards.46 PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations.47 China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges,48 as it emphasizes control above command.49 A culture of risk aversion and low levels of trust in subordinates impacts the PLA effectiveness.50 A highly centralized structure does not allow the PLAN to operate autonomously during a war. Therefore, a political commissar is positioned on PLAN warships and submarines.51 The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea.52 Nation states cannot project power globally through a rigid command-and-control system.53 PLAN submarines have the worst safety record in the world.54 The PLAN’s rudimentary nuclear missile submarine fleet carries a limited number of missiles.55 The PLAN cannot threaten the US mainland, as its submarines will have to sail through chokepoints such as the Kuriles and the Ryukyus islands, Luzon Strait, Taiwan Strait, and the Philippine archipelago—all of which are controlled by the USN.56 These chokepoints, forming a crescent-shaped chain, are also a defensive line for US containment policy; and the United States is involved in monitoring them. The PLAN submarine power is outdated, compared to the overwhelming USN undersea warfare capabilities. The US submarine arm brings strategic deterrence to the Indo-Pacific through a wide array of capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare antisurface warfare precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and special warfare capabilities. Soviet weapon systems were much sought after by the United States to learn their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft defected during the Cold War. An Iraqi MiG 21 defected to Israel, while a Soviet MiG 25 landed in Japan. The aircraft were later handed over to the United States to decipher the technical details. However, US intelligence is not similarly orchestrating any defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, as the United States is not interested in obsolete Chinese technology. Instead, China is stealing weapon data or reverse engineering US weapon systems.57 The CCP-controlled military press described the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter aircraft as a “flopping fish” and criticized it for lacking the stealth capabilities of the F-35 Lightning.58 The US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat during the First Gulf War, while the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft have been deployed in conflict zones. However, the PLAAF has not operationally inducted the J-31 fighter aircraft while the J-20 fighter aircraft has not yet proven its capabilities in any bilateral or multilateral military exercise. The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft. China’s Vulnerable A2/AD Zones A study of modern wars suggests that the United States will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone. This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations. The United States has a devastating array of lethal weapon systems, such as submarines, for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks, which destroyed the Iraqi military.59 Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland. Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military. The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam. The USN and USAF have signed a USD 414 million contract for autonomously guided with onboard sensors, jam-resistant, and difficult to detect antiship LRASM.60 The stealthy Zumwalt-class warship—equipped with emerging technologies—can sail undetected in littoral waters and contested territories to launch LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles. China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems, as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.61 During a war, the bases will be annihilated by the USN as the PLA cannot hide behind hills and forests. Once destroyed, these facilities cannot be supported from the mainland, as the logistical supplies will be demolished by the USN. China’s military modernization may enhance A2/AD zones, but it does not contribute to a blue-water, sea-control capability.62 China’s Hyped DF-21 Missile The antiship DF-21 missile, carried by colossal transporter erector launchers, has a range of 1,400 miles. The missile regiments are based in the barren Gobi Desert, which makes it an easy target for the US military. The DF-21 has been tested on a stationary ship, but it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target.63 A system of systems is required to track the AC,64 acquire the precise location, keep the missile locked on the target, penetrate the carrier’s multilayered defenses, and provide mid-course updates as within one hour the ship will have moved 30 miles. China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures.65 The United States and Russia have not yet developed a missile equivalent to the DF-21. However, China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range. China does not release the missile testing data, leading to many questions, including whether it can hit moving targets. Does it have precision targeting technologies?66 Until proven otherwise, the functionality of the missile is based on nothing but circumstantial inference and speculation.